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Summary  findings
Catalan,  Impavido,  and Musalem  study  the relationship  Africa,  and Thailand.  They  do not present  a theoretical
between  the development  of contractual  savings  (assets  framework  but do explain how the growth of the
of pension  funds and life  insurance  companies)  and non-  contractual  savings  sector  is thought to promote  financial
life  insurance  and the development  of stock  markets  development.
(market  capitalization  and value  traded). Their  The authors find evidence  in the data that causality
contribution  lies in providing  time-series  evidence  on a  between  institutions  and markets  either does not exist  or,
hypothesis  that is very popular-but  had not been  if it exists,  runs predominantly  from institutions  to
substantiated-among supporters  of fully  funded  pension  markets.  To a lesser  extent, there is simultaneous
systems  in which  funds invest large  shares  of their  causality  between  institutions  and markets.  Furthermore,
portfolios  in tradable securities  (equities,  bonds).  there is limited  evidence  that causality  runs only from
The literature  is not clear on its assumption  regarding  markets  to institutions  (the only  exception  seems  to be
causality  between  contractual  savings  and capital market  for non-life  insurance  in developing  countries).
development.  A one-way  or two-way  relationship  is  Results  seem  to support the idea that the development
assumed,  usually  interchangeably;  the authors address  of institutional  investors  is likely  to promote the growth
the question  of which  leads  empirically.  They present  of market capitalization  more than that of value  traded.
the evidence,  including  descriptive  statistics  and the  In developing  countries,  there seems  to be no causality
results  of Granger  causality  tests, for OECD  countries  from pension  funds to growth in value  traded, while
and such countries  as Chile,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  South  there is causality  from life  and non-life  insurance.
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In the last two decades, there has been a dramatic growth in the assets managed
by contractual saving institutions (pension funds and life insurance companies) in
developed countries as well as in some developing countries as shown in Table 1. In
most countries in the sample, contractual savings share to GDP (deepening) increased
several fold during the period. Furthermore,  Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
and South Africa had contractual savings in excess of 100 percent of GDP in 1996. The
only country  in the sample that experienced  a decline in the participation of contractual
savings in GDP is Singapore.
Pension reform favoring funding is considered  to be one of the policy options that
policy-makers  face when attempting to develop the contractual savings sector, especially
in developing countries. As evidence  of the general interest on contractual savings
development and its potential effects in the economy, extensive literature on the
macroeconomic  role of pension funds has been developed and the debate on the benefits
of pension reforms has been enriched and intensified  in recent years.'
Many studies focused on the effect of pension reforms on household saving rate
and results are not conclusive. On the one hand, pension reform that relies on voluntary
contributions  based on expenditure  tax treatment as opposed to income tax treatment is
expected to have a negligible effect on saving as indicated by the extensive literature
available on the inelasticity  of saving to the real interest rate. 2 On the other hand, either
myopia or liquidity constraints explain why pension reforms based on mandatory
contributions could increase the household saving rate. The liquidity constraints are
assumed to affect young or low-income individuals  who cannot borrow to consume and
offset the compulsory saving. 3 However, the effect on national saving will also depend
on the government and firms response  to pension reform.
Even if the effect of a pension reform on the national savings rate were not
significant,  other effects could be important. In particular, capital markets development
is indicated  as one of the main potential consequences  of contractual savings
development.  4
This study is part of a larger research project that encompasses  various contractual
savings and financial sector issues. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the causality
between contractual savings and stock markets development. We emphasize  the role of
pension funds and life insurance companies as financial intermediaries,  and we compare
I  See, for example, Holzmann (1997), Arrau and Sclmidt-Hebbel (1993), Feldstein (1974, 1996),
Mackenzie,  Gerson  and  Cuevas  (1997),  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1998).
2  See  for  example,  Whitehouse  (1999).
3  See,  for example,  Feldstein  (1978),  Munnell  (1976),  Loayza,  Schmidt-Hebbel  and  Serven  (2000),
Samwick  (2000),  Smith  (1990),  Bailliu  and  Reisen  (1997),  Schmidt-Hebbel  and Serven,  eds. (1999).
4  See,  for example,  Bodie  (1990),  Davis  (1995),  Vittas  and Skully  (1991),  Vittas  (1998a,  1998b,
1999).-2  -
results when different institutions,  like non-life insurance companies are considered. The
literature is not clear on its assumption  regarding causality between contractual savings
and capital market development. A one-way or a two-way relationship is assumed,
usually interchangeably. In this paper, we address the question of which relationship
leads empirically. The evidence,  including descriptive  statistics as well as Granger
causality tests is presented for OECD countries and some other countries such as Chile,
Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand. The paper does not present a
theoretical framework  but explains with clear statements  and intuitive examples the way
in which we think the growth of the contractual savings sector promotes financial
development.
Table 1:  Contractual  savings ratio to GDP (percent)
Counts  1980  1985  1990  1996
Netherlands  66.90  93.65  108.11  148.19
United Kingdom  38.81  74.77  86.90  141.72
Switzerland  70.00  88.5  131.38
United States  43.01  59.33  69.20  94.80
Canada  30.29  38.08  47.80  64.59
Australia  33.49  57.52
Sweden  23.92  28.63  47.96
Norway  13.15  17.29  25.80  30.02
Belgium  16.42  20.55  27.20
Korea,  Rep.  4.06  10.48  19.24  24.36
Germnany  12.73  17.63  20.68  23.82
Austria  13.28  21.35
Spain  3.21  9.87  18.78
South Africa  39.27  55.93  78.13  126.01
Singapore  153.36  115.13  93.50
Chile  1.00  29.28  50.61
Malaysia  20.08  35.65  47.18  51.02
Thailand  2.10  4.80
Source: 1998  OECD Institutional  Investors Statistical Yearbook and WB institutional
investors database.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II, presents the key propositions on the
links between contractual savings and capital markets development. Their effects and
implications for the economy as a whole are analyzed in terms of growth, term structure
of interest rates, capital structure,  regulation, and comparative impact on developing
versus developed economies. Section III, discusses the role of contractual savings in the
structure of the financial sector. In particular, it distinguishes  between the effects of
contractual savings,  mutual funds and non-life insurance development. Section IV,
presents a descriptive analysis  of the data, which confirms that there is a positive relation
between contractual savings and capital markets development. Section V, analyzes the
causality between contractual savings and non-life insurance companies and market-3 -
capitalization  or value traded in stock markets. 5 Finally, Section VI summarizes  the
results and the main conclusions.
11  What  is Different  About  Contractual  Savings?
The key point to understanding  the macroeconomic  role of contractual savings
and more specifically,  their role as financial intermediaries,  is to observe that they have a
distinctive characteristic. While banks and open-end  mutual funds have mainly short-
term liabilities,  contractual savings institutions have long-term liabilities on their balance
sheets. 6 This distinction  has important  implications. It means that the depositors or
investors cannot "run" (withdraw their deposits suddenly and in a large scale) against the
assets of the contractual savings institutions  where they have claims. In contrast, both
banks and open-end mutual funds face the risk of an unexpected  run against their assets
that could generate a liquidity  problem, and potentially trigger their bankruptcy. As a
consequence,  the investment  and lending strategies of banks and open-end mutual funds
differ from those of the contractual savings institutions. Contractual savings institutions
have a natural advantage over banks in financing long-term investment projects and their
investment strategies will be more biased towards long-term bonds and the equity
markets.
A dynamic hedging principle is at work, in the sense that financial institutions try
to match the maturity structure  of their assets and liabilities. Hedged positions help to
reduce the risks they face; conversely  the lack of hedged positions imply that either
reinvestment  (short-term assets and long-term liabilities) or refinancing (long-term assets
and short-term liabilities)  decisions will have to be taken. The ensuing maturity
mismatch implies risk taking and can generate cash flow problems in volatile
environments.
As will become clear, for a given amount of total savings in the economy,
contractual savings growth (for example,  a pension reform from a pay-as-you-go to a
funded system, a reform that transforms corporate pensions that are based on book
reserves to funded schemes outside the firm, or reforms that improves  the regulatory and
tax environment)  are expected to stimulate financial development. This is because from
the point of view of household and corporate sectors, there is an important liquidity effect
at work. The accounts held in the contractual savings sector are completely illiquid from
the depositor's point of view. They can only be liquidated in the long-run upon
retirement of the beneficiary (either as a lump sum and/or annuity) or upon the
occurrence  of a particular event (e.g., death, disability);  finms  have no access to them.
Thus, if large deposits are made in contractual savings, this will change the actual
5  Market  capitalization  (also known  as  market  value)  is the share  price  times  the number  of shares
outstanding.  Stocks  traded  refers  to the total  value  of shares  traded  during  a given  period.
6  Although  open  pension  funds  (as  opposed  to closed  pension  funds,  which  are employer-sponsored
plans)  operate  like  open-end  mutual  funds,  their funds  are more  stable  because  they  are captive  to  the
industry  as a whole. Hence,  open  pension  funds  are less  exposed  to systemic  risks  than  are open-end
mutual  funds.portfolio composition of both households and corporations  between liquid and illiquid
assets to a level below their desired  ratio. Therefore, to restore equilibrium, households'
and corporations' demand for liquidity  has to be satisfied with additional holdings of
liquid assets. This could be achieved  by a reshuffling of portfolios; for instance, by
increasing holdings of deposits in the banking sector, open-end mutual funds, and traded
securities, at the expense of some other non-liquid assets that households or corporations
could have held (e.g., real estate, non-traded financial instruments). Thus, households'
and corporations' behavior will reinforce financial market development, which is
associated with contractual savings growth.
It is important  to remark that these and next propositions hold even when the total
saving of the household and corporate sectors remain constant. Total saving proved to be
very insensitive  to the variables that are supposed  to affect it, so the fact that the
propositions do not depend on the change in saving in the economy is remarkable.
Our analysis, although different, is consistent  with previous work. Davis (1995)
finds that pension fund portfolios  have a greater proportion  of uncertain capital and long-
term assets than the household sector. He also finds that the personal sector tends to hold
a much larger proportion of liquid assets. "The implication  is that a switch to funding
would increase the supply of long-term funds to capital markets and reduce bank
deposits, even if savings and wealth do not increase, so long as households do not
increase the liquidity of the remainder of their portfolios fully to offset growth of pension
funds". This, he explains, is the impact of a pension reform on capital markets and the
existence of the liquidity effect. Davis also suggests that there is some evidence that such
offsetting to restore liquidity exists.
Furthermore,  the growth of contractual savings implies a reallocation of savings
from intermediaries  with a high probability of facing a run against their assets (banks and
open-end mutual funds) towards intermediaries  with a low probability of facing a run
(pension funds and life insurance companies). This reallocation  means that funds are
moved towards institutions that invest more heavily in long-term bonds and equity. In
addition, of course, there could be an independent  effect of the reform on total savings
that would cause further financial development.
As an application of the previous statements  to the case of pension and life
insurance reforms, it is apparent that only an increase in the amount of assets
accumulated  in the contractual savings sector is necessary  to develop the capital markets
and that an increase in total savings is not necessary  at all. Therefore, pension reforms,
which increase the level of funding, will imply a large increase in assets managed by
pension funds and thus, a higher degree of capital market development. Of course, our
hypothesis also implies that if a pay-as-you-go system were to be transformed into a
partially funded scheme that would be able to accumulate assets at a sustainable pace it
would also produce the same financial deepening effect. This would be the case provided
reserves are invested in market instruments  and are not used as captive sources of financeby governments. 7 Accordingly, contractual  savings development  would imply a
movement  towards completing financial  market development.
Although funding generates positive externalities  through capital market
development,  this does not mean that forcing a given level of funding through mandatory
retirement schemes coincides with the social optimum. In other words, there is an
argument for a minimum level of mandated funding to provide a minimum level of
benefits, leaving the provision of additional  benefits to voluntary arrangements. This
minimum funding would be sufficient to address the market failures existing in a fully
voluntary scheme. These failures derive from myopia of individuals,  who do not
necessarily save enough for retirement needs or other contingencies  (e.g., death,
disability); from the moral hazard of individuals relying on Government retirement
income guarantee  schemes; and from the adverse selection  implicit in the different life
expectancy of individuals. Hence, a fully funded mandatory  pension system that ensures
a minimum level of benefits would maximize social welfare, whilst a mandatory PAYG
system that precludes the development  of stock markets would not.
The design of pension reform is likely to affect social welfare through this and
other channels. For instance, regulations imposed on the portfolio composition of
pension funds can severely affect the quantitative  impact of contractual savings
development  on capital markets. As an extreme example, if pension funds were
restricted to hold only government bonds, the development of contractual savings should
have a minimum  or no effect on stock markets and social welfare would be lower.
In order to understand  the mechanics of capital market development and its
relation to contractual savings and the economy as a whole, let us summarize the most
important propositions concerning  the macroeconomic  role of contractual savings.
Conceptually,  let us think of an economy with banks as the unique financial
intermediaries  that is subsequently  transformed into an economy with both banks and a
large contractual savings sector. The main micro/macroeconomic  effects are the
following.
11.1 Specialization  in the Financial Sector, the Term  Structure of Interest
Rates, and Growth
The development  of the contractual savings sector will initially have a static effect
where the banking sector will tend to specialize in financing investment  projects with
short maturity and the contractual savings institutions funding those investment  projects
with long maturity. Of course, portfolios  will be diversified and a complete
specialization  will not be observed, in the sense that only the shortest-maturity  projects
are financed by banks and only those with the longest maturity are financed by
contractual savings institutions. We would rather observe that the diversified portfolios
of banks are more biased towards short-term loans and those of the contractual savings
7  There  is some  evidence  however,  that  governments  do use  partially-funded  public  pension
schemes  as sources  of captive  finance.  For a discussion  see  Iglesias  and  Palacios  (2000).- 6 -
institutions are more biased towards long-term and risky assets but all institutions will
have all kinds of assets.
Again, regulations could introduce significant  distortions. If pension funds and
life insurance companies are restricted to holding primarily securities, there could be an
important cost associated to the contraction of the banking system. In the last two
decades, some academic economists  made important contributions  to the understanding
of the special role that banks play in the financial system.  8 Banks play an important
microeconomic  role of monitoring. Among other peculiarities,  banks finance "difficult"
projects requiring intensive monitoring. These "difficult" projects cannot be financed by
the issuance  of securities because large numbers of small security holders have no
incentive  to monitor individually. Bank loans and securities are not perfect substitutes
and the expansion of contractual savings can have a very important  distributional impact
on the economy. For instance, if small firms require more monitoring, the contraction of
the banking system will make the financing of those firms very expensive and there will
be incentives  to create corporations. This effect is exacerbated if contractual saving
institutions cannot hold loans, but it could exist even if there is no constraint on portfolio
holdings because the issuance of demand deposits and loans are complementary
activities. 9 These conclusions  are sensitive to the condition of the banking sector in an
economy. The introduction  of a funded pension scheme in an economy where the
probability of bank runs is relatively high (i.e., many emerging economies) will have
more important effects than in an economy with a relatively low probability of bank runs
(i.e., most developed economies). This is because in the latter case, banks would already
be allocating a significant  proportion  of their portfolio in long-term loans.
The development of contractual savings also implies that the long-term interest
rate should fall relative to the short-term rate and thus, more long-term projects will be
financed. Given the fact that the expected  return of long-term investment  projects is
higher than the returns on short-term  investments (a technologically  reasonable
assumption),  a higher growth rate will be observed.
11.2 Development  of the Stock Market and Growth
The introduction  of a funded pension system in the economy will increase the
demand for risky assets and will develop  the stock market even when total savings are
unchanged. The development of the stock market will be reflected in an increase in
market capitalization  and value traded as a fraction of the gross domestic product of the
economy. This development is usually accompanied by improvements  in financial
innovation and regulations (including  minority shareholders' protection), corporate
governance, and overall improvement in financial market efficiency (including reduction
in transaction costs), transparency, and competition. All these effects add depth and
8  See Fama, 1985,  James C. and Wier P.,1988, and Diamond,1984.
9  See for instance, Kashyap A., Rajan R.  and Stein J.C. (1998).- 7 -
liquidity  to the market and they are extensively  discussed in the literature.  '  Ultimately,
these effects will result in high rates of long-term growth.  i"
11.3 Improved  Financial  Structure  of Governments,  Banks  and  Firms,  and
Reduced  Sovereign  Debt
If there is an increase in the demand for long-term and risky assets, then in
equilibrium  both the debt/equity ratio of enterprises and the short-term debt/long-term
debt ratio of enterprises and governments  will fall. This will also be reflected in banks
undertaking less term transformation  risk. As we argued above, we also expect the
substitution  of loans for securities to have important implications for the economy.
The 1997  East Asia financial crisis has been, in great part, due to excessive term
transformation  undertaken by financial institutions,  excessive leverage of enterprises and
their excessive dependence on short-term  debt as opposed to long-term debt and equity
finance. This was in part due to the relative scarcity of long-term savings in these
economies. Therefore, the development  of long-term savings and capital markets would
reduce pressures on the banking system, thereby lengthening  the maturity of debts and
providing more equity-based financing for enterprises.
Furthermore,  increasing funding of pension liabilities  reduces the implicit
government  debt. The second potential impact is the development  of the market for long-
term government  bonds. Many developing countries are trying to extend the maturity  of
the public debt to make their economies less vulnerable  to refinancing. Thus, a
developed contractual savings sector will increase the set of possibilities of the
government  having more degrees of freedom to perform an adequate debt management
policy.
Accordingly, a developed contractual savings sector contributes to build a more
resilient economy, one that would be less vulnerable  to interest rate and demand shocks,
while creating a more stable business environment,  including macroeconomic stability.
The result will be a lower country risk premiumn,  hence lower equilibrium interest rates,
which increase investments and, ultimately, accelerate  growth.
11.4 Linkages  Between  Contractual  Savings  and  Banking  Regulation
We should keep in mind that the banking sector and the pension fund sector can
be seen as imperfect substitutes  in their role as financial intermediaries,  so these sectors
should not be regulated without  taking into consideration  their links. Independent
regulation cannot do better than regulation when all the linkages between banks, pension
funds, other financial intermediaries,  and the productive sector are considered. Because
10  See, for example, OECD, 1997, Davis, 1995,  Vittas, 1998,1999.
11  For discussions  on the impact of capital market development on growth see, for example, Levine
and Zervos, 1996,  and Levine, 1997.different regulations will affect the portfolio composition of pension funds, especially the
fraction of total funds allocated between shares and long-term bonds, the debt-equity
ratio of the productive sector will be sensitive to the regulatory regime. For example, if
regulations impose a binding maximum weight of equity in the portfolios of pension
funds, then these will hold more long-term bonds and loans, and thus, banks will have to
be more biased towards short-term  loans and firms will be more leveraged.
Ill  The Role of Contractual  Savings: Some Simple Numerical
Examples
This section provides some intuitive analysis and illustrates with simple examples
many of the previous propositions  in order to motivate the following analysis of the data.
111.1  The Structure  of the Economy and the Role of the Financial Sector
We assume that the household sector owns both financial and non-financial
assets. Individuals can hold money, shares, government and corporate bonds (publicly
traded and more liquid securities that can be traded in secondary  markets), loans, debt,
and equity (private and illiquid financial instruments  that are non traded in secondary
markets), either directly or indirectly through claims on financial intermediaries. These
financial intermediaries  in turn hold financial assets (and some non-financial assets too).
Households and financial intermediaries  as a whole hold the primary fmancial assets:
money, shares, government bonds, corporate bonds and loans (Figure 1).
In order to show that the development and relative size of institutional investors
changes something  in the economy as a whole, we have to prove that the demands for
primary financial assets will change either in their composition (shares, government
bonds, corporate bonds, loans), in their term structure (long-term, short-term), or in their
liquidity.
The following exercise provides helpful intuition for organizing our analysis of
the data. To begin with, let us suppose  that the economy is composed  of banks, a
household sector (there are no other financial intermediaries)  and a corporate sector. The
latter can issue either debt (bonds) or equity to finance their productive activities. The
consolidated  household-banking  sector can hold shares, bonds and non financial-illiquid
assets.
Initially, household-banks'  total savings are equal to $300 and their portfolio-
weights are the same for shares, bonds, and non-financial assets (i.e., 1/3, 1/3, 1/3). This
means that the household-banking  sector holds $100 in shares, $100 in bonds and $100 in
non-financial  assets. That is Case A in Table 2.- 9 -
Figure 1: Households' Asset Portfolio
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Table 2:  Portfolio  Composition
Demand  for Assets  Household  Sector  11  Contractual  Savings  hMutual  Funds
CSaras  Bonds  Non1F1  5  Sha50s  Bonds  No50Fin.  Sha1es  5onds  Non0n Sha0s  Bonds  No0+ln.
A  100  100  100  100  100  100  0  0  0  0  0  0
B  100  100  100  50  50  50  50  50  50  0  0  0
C  150  100  50  50  50  50  100  50  0  0  0  0
D  100  100  100  0  50  100  100  50  0  0  0  0
E  160  130  10  70  70  10  90  60  0  0  0  0
F  150  100  50  50  50  50  0  0  0  100  50  0
Notes:  I  With banks- 10-
Next, suppose that we introduce in the economy  a contractual  savings sector (e.g.,
pension funds) and we induce or force the household sector to contribute  $150 to
contractual savings institutions. Different hypothesis  about the investment  behavior of
pension funds and the reaction  of the household sector will imply  different results in the
composition of the aggregate  demand for assets. Let us analyze  different possibilities and
at the end, we will try to decide which one is the most likely to be observed in reality.
We assume that the aggregate  amount to be saved is not altered at all in the different
scenarios,  this helps understand  how the effect of contractual savings  on financial market
development  can be independent  of the total amount of savings in the economy.
If the portfolio choice of the contractual  savings sector were (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and
households  maintain  their investment  policy, there would be no change in the final
demand for shares and bonds, that is Case B in Table 2. Next, suppose  that the
contractual savings  sector is more willing to invest in shares than the household sector
and its portfolio choice is (2/3,1/3,0),  and that households maintain  their investment
policy, then the total demand for shares will be $150, the total demand for bonds will be
$100, and the aggregate demand for non-financial assets will be $50. That is Case C in
Table 2.
Of course, it is possible that individuals,  knowing  that pension funds will invest
more intensively  in shares on their behalf, adjust their investment  strategy in such a way
that at the end they hold the same  portfolio of assets as before the introduction  of the
pension fund. That is Case D in Table 2, the portfolio choice of the household sector is
(0, 1/3, 2/3).
In order to reach valid conclusions,  it is very important  to note that individuals
care not only about the asset composition  held either directly or through intermediaries
(contractual  savings  institutions and mutual funds),  but also about the liquidity of the
assets they hold. It is important  to observe that when households contribute  funds to the
contractual  savings sector, they suffer a big reduction in their liquid assets (in either Case
B, C or D). Furthermore,  it is necessary  to observe that in order to undo what the
contractual  savings sector is doing on their behalf in terms of asset composition,
households should increase the liquidity of their direct portfolio. This is why we think
that Case D is very unlikely to be observed in the real world.
Case E is the most likely result of a development  of the contractual  savings sector.
Households  try to restore  their liquidity  positions by selling illiquid assets (non-traded
financial and non-financial)  and this implies further development  of the capital market.
Thus, in the case of contractual savings development,  the liquidity  effect reinforces the
effect of the contractual  savings bias towards shares to promote capital market
development.
Tn  contrast,  if there were a reallocation  of savings from households  to mutual
funds, the liquidity  effect would not exist (as in Case F in Table 2) or it could even play
in the opposite  direction  because mutual fund portfolios are more biased towards liquid
assets. Individuals  could try to reduce their own holdings of liquid assets by selling
shares and bonds in order to buy illiquid assets - i.e., non-traded financial and non-- 11  -
financial assets. Therefore, from this numerical example  we can conclude the proposition
described in the next section.
111.2  Differential  Impact of Contractual  Savings and Mutual Funds on
Capital Markets  Development
For a given amount of total savings, a reallocation  of funds from the consolidated
household-banking  sector towards either the contractual  savings or the mutual funds
sector is expected  to increase the demand for shares and develop the capital market. The
impact of contractual savings development  on capital markets is expected to be greater
than the impact of mutual funds development  because in the former case, the liquidity
effect reinforces the aggregate demand for shares.
In addition, if the real world were like Case D in Table 2, we would observe in the
data that when the financial assets of contractual savings  institutions grow, there is no
increase in market capitalization. As we will see, the data shows a strong correlation
between the financial assets of contractual savings institutions and market capitalization,
supporting the reasonable hypothesis that the development of contractual savings will
move the economy from a Case like A to a Case like E in Table 2. (The same basic
intuition can be applied to the comparison  between short-term  and long-term assets
instead of shares and bonds).
111.3  Contractual  Savings Institutions Bias Towards  Long-Term  Assets and
Shares: A Simple Framework
Pension funds will be more likely to invest in long-term assets and shares than
individuals,  partly because the large volume of transactions allow them to reduce
transaction costs and they can diversify risks more efficiently. Only in this restricted
sense, we can say that the pension funds provide similar financial services to those
provided  by mutual funds. Nonetheless,  we should not forget  that the nature of these
institutions is very different (the savings received by the pension system may be
compulsory  and a large fraction of the population may be required to contribute, and
savings are kept by the institution  for long periods of time, etc.) and we expect that their
development  will produce differential impact on capital markets (volatility, liquidity,
etc.).
The most interesting  question is why pension funds have an advantage over banks
either in financing long-term investment  projects (by lending money in the form of loans
or by buying long-term corporate or government  bonds, ignoring  the liquidity aspects for
the moment) or in investing in equity.
The simple  theoretical structure that follows will provide us the intuition for
understanding  the different investment  strategies  pursued by banks and pension funds.
To take the simplest case, we show that those intermediaries  facing a low probability  of a
run have an advantage when it comes  to financing long-term investment  projects.- 12 -
Suppose  that an institution (we will see later that it could be a bank or a pension
fund) receives a deposit of one dollar at date 0 and promises to pay a deposit rate id = 5
percent per period to the depositor. At that moment, the institution  has to decide whether
to lend the money to finance a long-term project (2 periods) or a short-term  project (1
period). If the institution finances the long-termn  project it will receive a return of iL = 20
percent per period at date 2 and if it finances the short-term project it will receive a return
of is = 10 percent per period at date 1.
After the investment  decision is taken and before date 1, there is a run against the
assets of the institution  that occurs with probability P and there is no run with probabi'.Xy
1 - P.  If the investment  decision of the institution  was to finance the long-term project
and there is a run, then the institution  will be in an illiquid position and will default on its
debt, thus it will go bankrupt and will lose its reputation with a loss equal to - C = -2  12
If the long-term project was financed and there is no run, it will get
(l + iL)  _(l+id)2  =0.3375 at date 2.
If the investment decision of the firm was to finance the short-term project and
there is a run, the institution  will be liquid and able to pay the depositor, the profit will be
(, +  2S  ) -(1+  id )  = 0.05. If there is no run, the institution  will reinvest for one period
and at the end it will get (1+  is) 2_( 1+id) 2= 0.1075.
TIhe  strategy  to be chosen will be the one that maximizes expected profits. The
institution will choose to finance the long-term project if and only if the expected profit
of that strategy is greater than the expected profit of the alternative one. In our example,
the following condition must be satisfied:
-2P+(l-P)0.3375  2  0.05P+(l-P)0.1075  iff  P <0.1
Tlhus,  the inequality holds for a value of P that is lower or equal to 0.10. In other
words, the long-term project will be financed by the institution only if the probability of a
run is low enough.
This example is instructive  in several directions. We can think of this institution
as being a pension fund if P = 0 (you cannot run against the pension fund) and a bank for
P greater than 0.  Suppose an economy where P in the banking sector is greater than 0.1,
that means that the banks will either finance the long-term  project at very high interest
rates or not finance it at all, while a pension fund will do it, thus, the introduction of
pension funds will have a very important  real effect in promoting long-term investment
and growth. Now, suppose other economy where P in the banking sector is lower than
0.1, that means that the banks will choose to finance the long-term project, thus the
development  of the pension fund sector will not generate  this type of effect.
12  This  is an arbitrary  number  that  is supposed  to represent  all  the costs  of shutting  down  the
institution,  including  the cost  in  reputation  and  the present  value  of future  profits  foregone.  The message  of
our  story  is insensitive  to the particular  number  used.- 13  -
Think of the first type of economy  as one without a very resilient banking sector
where the probability of a bank run is not negligible,  and think of the second economy as
one with a strong banking sector. We can conclude that the potential benefits of
developing the contractual savings sector are greater in economies without very strong
banks, at least in terms of financial  deepening, the term structure of investment and
growth.  13
Figure 2: Payoff Tree
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IV  Descriptive  Evidence
Figure 3 shows how contractual savings have become the dominant financial asset
in several countries. In 1996,  they represented 50 percent or more of financial assets
(defined as the aggregation  of money, quasi-money and contractual savings assets) in 9
out of 29 countries.' 4 Furthermore,  the same figure shows that non-OECD countries such
13  Of  course,  in  this  very  simple  example,  the institution  is constrained  to hold  a completely
specialized  portfolio,  but  a rigorous  model  with  portfolio  diversification  can  be constructed  and  a similar
parable  can  be  told. Similarly,  the  basic  structure  can  also  be extended  to include  risky  assets.
Money  and  quasi  money  are  liabilities  of  the  consolidated  banking  system  (including  the  Central
Bank), which are liquid financial assets held by the household sector. Clearly, the assets of contractual- 14 -
as South Africa, Chile, Singapore,  and Malaysia have a dominant or a very important
contractual savings sector.
Figure 3:  Contractual  savings in system financial assets (%,1996)
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Source: 1998 OECD  Institutional  Investors Statistical Yearbook and WB institutional investors database.
Figure 4 shows the positive correlation  between the financial assets of contractual
savings institutions and market capitalization  as a fraction of GDP for a cross section of
OECD and non-OECD countries in 1996 (the positive relation is very stable for different
years). Those countries with a more developed contractual savings sector are also
countries with more developed stock markets. Furthermore, Figure 5 indicates a positive
relationship  between contractual savings development  and the liquidity of the capital
markets (measured by value traded over GDP).
Figure 6 explores  the relationship  between changes in contractual savings as a
fraction of GDP and changes in market capitalization  over GDP for the same countries
between 1990 and 1996. Figure 7 presents a similar relationship  between changes in
contractual savings and changes in value traded as a fraction of GDP. It is clear that
those countries that were able to develop their contractual savings sector also show a
higher growth in their stock markets in terms of capitalization  and value traded in the
same period. The same conclusions  are reached with estimates using panel data for 26
countries and with about 300 observations.  '5
savings institutions  belong to the household sector. Of course,  there is some double counting since assets
of contractual savings institutions include cash and bank deposits.
15  See Impavido and Musalem, 2000- 15  -
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Now, let us see whether the data show that contractual savings institutions are
more willing to hold risky and long-term assets than other institutional investors and
banks. Figure 8 compares the portfolios of US contractual savings institutions with those
of the banking sector.
Figure 8: United States Financial  Institutions  Portfolios
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Source:  OECD, Institutional  Investors Yearbook, 1997,  and Federal Reserve, Monthly Bulletins.
Among the remarkable  facts in Figure 8 are the high weight of securities in the
portfolios of pension funds (84 percent), life insurance companies (79 percent) and open-
end investment  companies (90 percent) relative to banks (23 percent), and the low weight
of short-term loans and cash in the portfolios of those institutions (4 percent, 7 percent,
and 8 percent respectively) relative to banks (59 percent). Pension funds, life insurance
companies and open-end investment companies are also heavily invested in long-term
bonds. Clearly, US contractual savings institutions hold larger fractions of their total
assets invested in traded securities such as stocks and long-term bonds while the assets of
the banking sector are invested more heavily in private financial instruments (loans) of
short-term  maturity.- 18 -
Finally, Figure 9 shows the average portfolio composition of different
institutional  investors of some other selected  OECD countries. In the United Kingdom,
shares and long-term bonds account for 80 percent or more of the portfolios of
contractual savings institutions. There is a very high fraction of loans in the portfolios in
the Netherlands,  but it is also striking that they are almost completely long-term loans.
We could be tempted to say that the role of contractual  savings institutions in the
Netherlands is similar to those of banks in terms of lending strategy, but the financial
services  provided are absolutely different in terms of maturity structure. In Norway, even
when we do not have the maturity structure of loans, the presumption is that a similar
story can be told. Sweden and Norway are also examples of our hypothesis that if there
are binding restrictions to invest in shares, then long-term bonds and/or loans will be in
high demand. Finally, in Australia, contractual savings institutions invest more than 50
percent of their portfolios in shares and long-term bonds; while they represent about 40
percent in other institutional investors' portfolios.
Thus, according  to the evidence,  if there were a reallocation of assets from the
banking sector  to the contractual savings sector, there would be a shift in the relative
demands for financial instruments. There would be a reduction in the demand for non-
traded financial instruments,  or in other words, we would observe a reduction in the
supply of funds to be lent to firms in the non-corporate sector (i.e., firms that do not issue
publicly traded stock and debt), and there would be an increase in the demand for
publicly traded financial instruments such as stocks and bonds.
Moreover, the fact that the portfolio weight of long-term bonds is high for
contractual savings institutions means that the corporate sector will have additional long-
term funds to finance their long-term production  plans.  As a consequence,  the profit
opportunities  in the corporate sector will induce the entry of new firms that will issue
both equity and debt, increasing  the market capitalization  of the economy, and thus, the
market will become more liquid and the value traded in stocks will increase. Finally, the
increased volume of transactions will imply a higher demand for money (transaction
motive) and overall financial  deepening in the economy.
The international  evidence suggests  some stylized facts about contractual savings
institutions. The fraction of investment in either shares or long-term assets (either bonds
or loans) tends to be very high.  In all the cases, the weight of short-term loans is very
low. Obviously,  regulations, relative yields, risk and liquidity preferences, and tax
treatment could explain the differences in portfolios across these countries. The evidence
also suggests that if binding constraints are imposed on the fraction invested in shares,
they will try to invest their funds in the closer substitutes  such as long-term bonds and
long-term loans. The result will be a differential impact on the productive sector of the
economy and on the structure of the financial sector.- 19  -
Figure 9:  Institutional Investors' Portfolio
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Source:  OECD,  Instituotional Investors  Yearbook,  1997.- 20 -
V  Econometric  Evidence  on Contractual  Savings and Capital
Markets Development:  Which Leads?
This paper has emphasized  the direction of causality from contractual savings to
market capitalization. In Sections II and III, we argued that if contractual savings are
developed then market capitalization  would follow. In Section IV, we showed evidence
of a positive correlation  between these two variables across countries but the causality
between them was not studied.
It has been indicated (in the literature)  that it is difficult for contractual savings.
institutions to perform  their investment  activities effectively in countries whose capital
markets are small and illiquid. For instance, the implementation  of some active and
sophisticated  financial strategies require very frequent trading and given the large volume
of funds managed by pension funds, the price volatility implied by these strategies would
be too high if the stock market is not liquid enough. As Davis (1995) states:
"Experience,..., suggests that the successful development  of private pensions requires a
certain prior level of development  of the financial sector." Hence, at least theoretically,
the direction of causality could run from market capitalization  to contractual savings.
The empirical questions addressed in this section are the following. What
happened in each country  over time? Does the growth of contractual savings lead to the
expansion  in market capitalization? Or is it the other way around? Or is it a two-way
causation? Or is there no causation in any direction? To answer these questions, we ran
Granger causality  tests for some OECD and some developing countries. Unfortunately,
the number of observations  available for each country  is not ideal. Hence, the tests
presented below provide us with just preliminary  answers to our questions. Nevertheless,
the results obtained are quite encouraging  and deserve  to be taken into consideration.
The bivariate Granger causality test analyzes how useful some variables are in
forecasting other variables. In this sense, we can say that if variable x is not useful in
forecasting  y, then x does not Granger-cause  y.  The test is constructed  on the basis of the
following OLS regression:
y 1 =  LO +  i f3jY-i +t  i jxt_j +  u,
i=l  j=l
where p and q are chosen so that u, is white noise. The test conducted is an F test on the
q parameters for the variable  x.  If the regression is run over n observations,  the
distribution of the test is F(n, n - 2q - 1). Since the above regression is a dynamic
regression, the test is only asymptotically  valid. Hence, an asymptotic equivalent test
distributed as a X2(q) was reported.  16
16  For a detailed description of Granger causality  tests, see Granger (1969) and Harnilton (1994).- 21 -
In our study we analyze Granger causality  tests between four sets of institutions:
1) contractual savings financial assets over GDP (CS); 2) pension funds financial assets
over GDP (PF); 3) life insurance  financial assets over GDP (LI); and 4) non-life
insurance financial assets over GDP (NL); and two capital market development
indicators: 1) market capitalization  over GDP (MC); and 2) stock value traded over GDP
(VT) for 14 OECD and 5 developing countries taken separately  and for periods between
1975 and 1997. In each case, we are interested  in the causality  between each of the four
asset variables and market capitalization  and value traded in turn.  Tables A-D in
Appendix 1 present the Granger causality  tests for contractual savings, pension funds, life
insurance, and non-life insurance,  respectively.
Because our panels are relatively short, we decided to limit the length of the two-
lag polynomial  in order to maximize the number of observations  used in the regressions.
Hence, we selectedp = q = 1. Finally, because all our regressions use less than 30
observations  we also reported the Jarque-Bera  test for normality of residuals." 7 The
importance of this test is that since we cannot invoke the central limit theorem to justify
the distribution of the Granger-causality  tests, our results critically depend on the
normality of the residuals.
As an example for the interpretation  of our results, we will describe in detail the
case of the causality test between contractual savings (CS) and market capitalization
(MC) or contractual savings and value traded (VT) for the United States  which are
reported in Table 8 of Appendix 1. The Granger regressions  were conducted  using 17
observations. In the first line, we test the null hypothesis that contractual savings do not
Granger-cause  market capitalization. Since  p = q = 1, we have 3 d.f. that we have to
account for and hence, under the null, the F test is distributed with 1 and 14 d.f.  The
value of the statistics is 0.035 with a p-value of 0.854. Clearly, we cannot reject the null
that contractual savings do not Granger-cause  market capitalization. This is confirmed
by the asymptotic  equivalent  test in the following 3 columns,  distributed under the null as
X 2(1). For this second test, the statistics is 0.043 with a p-value of 0.837. Finally, in the
last 3 columns  we report the Jarque-Bera  (JB) normality  test. Here, the null hypothesis is
that residuals are normally distributed, which cannot be rejected. The statistics for this
test is 1.060  which under the null is distributed  as a X 2(2) and it gives a p-value of 0.59.
Since we can infer that residuals are normally distributed we can also infer that the
statistics of the Granger tests are distributed as they should be.
The second line of Table 8 in Appendix 1 tests the null hypothesis that market
capitalization  (MC) does not Granger-cause  contractual savings (CS). Again the null
cannot be rejected in both tests and residuals are normally distributed. The last two lines
for the United States in Table 8 in Appendix 1 give us the results of the causality tests
between contractual savings (CS) and value traded (VT). The absence of causality in
both directions cannot be rejected and residuals are normally distributed.
17  See Bera and Jarque, 1980.- 22 -
In the next sections, we summarize  the results reported in the tables in Appendix
1 by using 10 percent significance  level as the critical level for rejecting or failing to
reject the null hypothesis in each test.
V.  1  Granger causality  between contractual  savings and market
capitalization  or value traded
For market capitalization  we found 7 cases out of 14 OECD countries (United
Kingdom,  Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Germany),  for which the
hypothesis  that contractual savings do not Granger-cause  market capitalization  is rejected
and the hypothesis that market capitalization  does not Granger-cause contractual savings
is not rejected. Therefore, for these countries, it appears that Granger causality runs only
from contractual savings to market capitalization  and not the other way round. For 2
OECD countries (Norway and Portugal),  Granger causality  between contractual savings
and market capitalization  seems to run in both direction.  18 Finally, for 5 OECD countries
(United States, Australia, Korea, Sweden, and Austria) both null hypotheses can not be
rejected. Therefore, for these countries,  the variables contractual savings and market
capitalization  follow independent  auto-regressive  processes and neither contractual
savings cause market capitalization  nor does market capitalization  cause contractual
savings. For developing countries,  causality seems to run from contractual savings to
market capitalization  only in Thailand;1 9 in both ways for Chile and South Africa; and in
neither direction  for Singapore  and Malaysia. 20
For value traded, we found 6 OECD countries (United Kingdom, Korea, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Austria), for which the null hypothesis that contractual savings
does not Granger-cause  value traded was rejected while the null hypothesis that value
traded does not Granger-cause  contractual savings could not be rejected. Hence, for
these countries causality  between contractual savings and value traded seems to run from
contractual savings  to value traded only. For 2 OECD countries (Netherlands,  and
Germany)  Granger causality from value traded to contractual savings seems to run in
both directions. 21  For 6 OECD countries (United States,  Belgium, Australia, Spain,
Canada, and Portugal), causality  between contractual  savings and value traded seems to
run in neither direction. For 2 non-OECD countries (Chile and Thailand), causality
seems to run from contractual savings to value traded only.  For Singapore and South
Africa, causality  seems to run from value traded to contractual savings only. Finally, for
1  8  Although  at  5 percent  significance  level,  causality  between  market  capitalization  and  contractual
savings  seems  to run  from  contractual  savings  to market  capitalization  only  for  Norway.
19  Although  at  5 percent  significance  level,  causality  between  market  capitalization  and  contractual
savings  seems  to  run  from  contractual  savings  to market  capitalization  only  for  South  Africa.
20  Notice  that  the  results  for  Malaysia  and  South  Africa  should  be  taken  as suspicious  as  normality
test  was  not  always  passed  at  5  percent  significance  level.
21  Notice  that  the  results  for  Germany  should  be  taken  as  suspicious  as  normality  test  was  not  always
passed  even  at 5  percent  significance  level.- 23 -
Malaysia, there seems to be no causality  between contractual savings and value traded in
either direction. 22
V.2  Granger causality between  pension funds and market capitalization  or
value traded
Since the intersection  between the data on pension funds and life insurance
companies is not complete  and Granger causality  tests are very sensitive to the number of
observations  and lags used, we decided to run the same exercise of the previous section
for life insurance and pension funds separately. We also explored the causality between
market capitalization  or value traded and non-life insurance. In a following section, we
summarize  these results and compare them with the results on life insurance and pension
funds.
Results on causality  between pension funds and market capitalization  or value
traded are reported in Table 9 in Appendix 1. For market capitalization,  we found 6 cases
out of 14 OECD countries (Korea, Spain,  Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and
Finland), for which the hypothesis that pension funds do not Granger-cause  market
capitalization  is rejected and the hypothesis that market capitalization  does not Granger-
cause pension funds is not rejected. Therefore, for these countries, it appears that
Granger causality  runs only from pension funds to market capitalization  and not the other
way round. 23 For Portugal, causality  seems to run in both directions. 24 For Belgium,
Granger causality between pension funds and market capitalization  seems to run from
market capitalization  to pension funds. 25 Finally, for 4 OECD countries (United States,
United Kingdom, Australia, Germany,  and Austria), both null hypotheses can not be
rejected. Therefore, for these countries the variables pension funds and market
capitalization  follow independent  auto-regressive  processes and neither pension funds
causes market capitalization  nor market capitalization  causes pension funds. In Thailand
and South Africa, causality seems to run from pension funds to market capitalization. In
Chile causality  between pension funds and market capitalization  seems to run in both
directions. In Singapore  and Malaysia, causality between pension funds and market
capitalization  seems to run in neither direction.  26
For value traded, we found 5 OECD countries (United Kingdom, Belgium, Korea,
Norway, Sweden, and Finland), for which only the null that pension funds do not cause
value traded could be rejected. Hence, for these countries, it appears  that Granger
causality  runs only from pension funds to value traded and not the other way round. For
22  Notice  that  the results  for Singapore  and  Malaysia  should  be taken  as suspicious  as normality  test
was  not always  passed  at 5 percent  significance  level.
23  Although  at 5  percent  significance  level,  there  seems  to be no causality  between  market
capitalization  and  pension  funds  in either  direction  for Korea  and  Sweden.
24  But only  from  pension  funds  to market  capitalization  at 5 percent  significance  level.
25  Although  at 5  percent  significance  level,  no causality  between  market  capitalization  and  pension
funds  seems  to exist  in either  direction  for  Belgium.
26  For South  Africa,  Thailand,  and  Malaysia  normality  test was  not always  passed  and  results  should
be treated  with  caution.- 24 -
3 OECD countries (Australia,  Netherlands, and Austria), causality between pension funds
and value traded seems to run in both directions. For 5 countries (United States, Spain,
Canada, Germany, and Portugal) causality  between pension funds and value traded seems
to run in neither direction. For the developing countries in our sample, two way causality
was found only for Chile while all other countries  do not show causality significant in
either direction.  27
V.3  Granger causality  between life insurance  and market capitalization  or
value traded
In the case of life insurance, we have longer series as shown in Table 10 in
Appendix 1. For market capitalization,  we found 9 OECD countries (United Kingdom,
Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Finland, Germany,  Austria, and Portugal) for
which causality  seems to run from life insurance  to market capitalization  only. For all
other OCED countries, we found no causality  in either direction between life insurance
and market capitalization. For developing countries the results are mixed: for Thailand,
causality seems to run from life insurance  to market capitalization; 28 while for South
Africa, causality seems to run in both directions; 29 and for Chile, Singapore,  and
Malaysia, causality  between life insurance and market capitalization  seems to run in
neither direction.
For value traded, we found 6 OECD countries (United Kingdom, Korea, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Portugal) for which causality  between life insurance and value
traded seems to run from life insurance to value traded only. For the Netherlands and
Germany, causality seems to run in both ways. For 5 countries (United States,  Belgium,
Australia, Spain, and Austria) no causality in either direction was found. For developing
countries,  we found causality from life insurance to value traded only in Chile,
Singapore,  and Malaysia. We found a two way causality in Thailand  and from value
traded to life insurance only in South Africa.
V.4  Granger causality  between non-life insurance  and market
capitalization  or value traded
In the case of non-life insurance  results are shown in Table 11 of Appendix 1.
We found 6 OECD countries (Belgium, Korea, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and
Austria) for which causality  runs from non-life insurance to market capitalization  only.
We found two countries (Norway  and Portugal) for which causality between non-life
insurance and market capitalization  runs in both directions. We found 5 countries
(United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, and Finland) for which no causality was
27  Results  for developing  countries  should  be taken  with  caution  as  normality  test  was not always
gassed.
'2 8 But  not at 5 percent  significance  level.
29  But  only  from  life insurance  to market  capitalization  at 5 percent  significance  level. Again,  results
for  developing  countries  should  be taken  with  caution  as normnality  test was  not always  passed.- 25 -
found between non-life insurance and market capitalization. For developing countries,
the picture is mixed: for Thailand,  we found causality in both directions; for Singapore
and Malaysia, we found causality  from market capitalization  to non-life insurance only;
and for Chile and South Africa,  we found no causality in either direction.
For value traded, we found 4 OECD countries (United  Kingdom, Netherlands,
Norway, and Finland) for which causality  runs from non-life insurance to value traded
only; 3 countries (Sweden, Germany, and Portugal) for which causality  runs in both
ways; Australia, for which causality seems to run from value traded to non-life insurance
only; and 6 countries (United States,  Belgium, Korea, Spain, and Austria) with no
causality in either direction between non-life insurance and value traded. In developing
countries, we found Chile, Malaysia, and South Africa for which causality runs from non-
life insurance  to value traded only; in Thailand, causality seems to run in both directions;
and in Singapore,  causality seems to run from value traded to non-life insurance.
V.5  Summary of results
The following table helps summarize  the results obtained with the Granger
causality  tests.  The first column in each quadrant (->) reports the number of countries for
which we found Granger causality  from one of the institutions (contractual savings,
pension funds, life insurance,  non-life insurance)  to one of the market indicators (market
capitalization  or value traded); the second column reports the number of countries for
which causality  runs only from one of the markets to one of the institutions (<-); the third
column reports the number of countries for which causality  runs both ways (<->); and the
fourth column reports the number of countries for which no causality was found in either
direction (<>).
Table 3:  Granger causality tests: summary
Mc  VT
CS  7  0  2  5  6  0  2  6
c  PF  7  1  1  5  6  0  3  5
o  U  9  0  0  5  6  1  2  5
NL  6  2  1  5  4  1  3  6
O  CS  2  0  1  2  2  2  0  1
PF  2  0  1  2  0  0  1  4
(?  U  1  0  1  3  3  1  1  0
2  NL  0  2  1  2  3  1  1  0
There is significant  evidence in these data that either causality  between
institutions and markets does not exist, or if it exists, it is predominantly  from institutions
to markets only. To a lesser extent, causality simultaneously  exists in the two directions
between institutions and markets. Furthermore,  there is very limited evidence that
causality runs from markets to institutions  only (the only exception  seems to be for non-
life insurance in developing countries). Results seem to support  the idea that the- 26 -
development  of institutional  investors is likely to promote the development  of market
capitalization  more than value traded. For developing countries, pension funds seem not
to Granger cause value traded development  while life and non-life insurance do.  Thus, in
developing countries pension funds predominantly  buy and hold shares.
The following  tables allow us to analyze other causality  patterns among the
countries in our sample. Table 4 lists, by institution,  the countries for which we find one
way Granger causality  from institutions  to market capitalization  or value traded only;
these are indicated with a "1". Table 5 lists, by institution,  the countries for which we
find a two way Granger causality  between institutions and markets. Table 6 lists, by
institution,  the countries  for which we could not find Granger causality between
institutions and market on either direction.
When causality exists only from institutions to markets this seems to take place in
countries where financial markets are not yet completely developed. In countries with
complete and sophisticated  financial markets like the United States, no causality is found
in either direction. Notice though that results are ambiguous  for some countries. For
example, in Korea, pension funds and non-life insurance seem to Granger-cause  market
capitalization  while life insurance and in general contractual savings seem not to cause
market capitalization. For this country causality is stronger among institutions with
respect to value traded. In the United Kingdom, all institutions seem to Granger-cause
value traded and only contractual savings and life insurance companies, market
capitalization.
Table 4: Granger causality (one way) from institutions to markets only
MC  VT
CS  PF  LU  NL  TOT  CS  PF  U  NL  TOT
NLD  1  1  1  1  4  FIN  1  1  1  1  4
BEL  1  1  1  3  GBR  1  1  1  1  4
CAN  1  1  1  3  NOR  1  1  1  1  4
DEU  1  1  1  3  CHL  1  1  1  3
FIN  1  1  1  3  KOR  1  1  1  3
THA  1  1  1  3  M  SWE  1  1  1  3
AUT  1  1  2  MYS  1  1  2
ESP  1  1  2  I AUT  1  1
GBR  1  1  2  BEL  1  1
KOR  1  1  2  7  NLD  1  1
NOR  1  1  2  PRT  1  1
SWE  1  1  2  SGP  1  1
ZAF  1  1  2  THA  1  1
PRT  1  1  ZAF  1  1
AUS  0  AUS  °
CHL  0  CAN  0
MYS  0  DEU  O
SGP  0  ESP  0
USA  0  USA  0
TOT  9  9  10  6  TOT  8  6  9  7
Notes  See Table 12 in Appendix 2 for the list  of countries.- 27 -
Table 5:  Granger  causality (two ways) between institutions  and markets
Mc  VT
CS  PF  U  NL  TOT  CS  PF  U  NL  TOT
PRT  1  1  1  3  DEU  1  1  1  3
CHL  1  1  2  NLD  1  1  1  3
NOR  1  1  2  THA  1  1  2
THA  1  1  AUS  1  1
ZAF  1  1  AUT  1  1
AUS  0  CHL  1  1
AUT  0  PRT  1  1
BEL  0  SWE  1  1
CAN  0  BEL  o
DEU  0  CAN  0
ESP  0  ESP  0
FIN  0  FIN  0
GBR  0  GBR  0
KOR  0  KOR  0
MYS  0  MYS  0
NLD  0  NOR  0
SGP  0  SGP  0
SWE  0  USA  0
USA  0  ZAF  0
TOT  3  2  1  3  TOT  2  4  3  4
Notes: See Table 12 in Appendix 2 for the list of countries.
Table 6:  No Granger  causality between institutions and markets
MC  VT
CS  PF  U  NL  TOT  CS  PF  U  NL  TOT
USA  1  1  1  1  4  ESP  1  1  1  1  4
AUS  1  1  1  3  USA  1  1  1  1  4
MYS  1  1  1  3  BEL  1  1  1  3
SGP  1  1  1  3  CAN  1  1  1  3
AUT  1  1  2  AUS  1  1  2
CHL  1  1  2  iMYS  1  1  2
ESP  1  1  2  PRT  1  1  2
GBR  1  1  2  AUT  1  1
KOR  1  1  2  CHL  1  1
SWE  1  1  2  DEU  1  1
CAN  1  1  KOR  1  1
DEU  1  1  SGP  1  1
FIN  1  1  THA  1  1
ZAF  1  1  ZAF  1  1
BEL  0  FIN  0
NLD  0  GBR  0
NOR  0  NLD  0
PRT  0  NOR  0
THA  0  SWE  0
TOT  7  7  8  7  TOT  7  9  5  6
Notes: See Table 12  in Appendix 2 for the list of countries.
There are other facts that help interpret some of our results. For example, the
absence of causality in either direction  in Malaysia and Singapore  could be explained by
the contractual savings  regime in these countries as well as financial sector policies.- 28 -
Singapore  and Malaysia have centrally managed provident funds, which are not geared at
investing in shares. In Malaysia, contractual savings institutions invested in shares from
4 to 7 percent of their financial assets during 1987-93. Singapore only recently has
allowed some members  to pick private managers and to determine how a portion of their
Central Provident Fund balance will be invested. 30 Therefore, there should be no surprise
that there is no causality  in any direction between contractual savings and stock markets
in these countries.
Table 7:  Shares of Stocks in Investment Portfolios: Selected Countries
Country  Year  Contractual  Life  Pension
Savigs  Funds
Malaysia  1993  7.01  17.86  5.17
Singapore  1996  5.67  33.50  0.  00
Source: WB institutional investors database.
Another particular case is Chile, where causality  for pension funds runs in both
directions. This could be explained,  in great part, by their investment  regulations. When
the system was introduced, they were quite draconian, at that time; the Government  was
mainly interested  in preserving  assets, hence, pension funds were allowed to invest
almost exclusively  in government securities. In addition, real interest rates on bonds and
bills were very high. As the system and the market developed,  the regulations allowed
increasing  participation of shares in pension fund portfolios. At the same time, real
interest rates were declining thus demand for shares increased fueled by both effects.
Obviously,  regulation of investment  policies of these institutions and after tax rates of
return on financial  instruments matters. 31 The cautiousness  and reactive approach
followed  by the Chilean authorities  resulted in a two-way causality.
The evidence is consistent  with the direction of causality emphasized in this
paper. Contractual savings promote capital market development  in countries where
capital markets are relatively small. Of course, in countries where capital markets are
already developed,  the effect is not as strong and the direction  of causality is not as clear.
In those countries,  we expect reciprocal and weaker effects between both variables. The
latter would be, in part, due to the fact that the illiquidity effect of contractual savings, as
discussed above, would be diluted in countries with well-developed financial markets. 32
30  See  Asher,  1999.
31  See Srinivas,  Whitehouse  and Yermo, 1999.
32  The direction of causality from contractual savings to capital markets was also accepted in
Impavido and Musalem (2000).- 29 -
VI  Summary,  Conclusions  and Recommendations
Contractual savings are powerful enough to increase the supply of long-term
funds and develop the capital markets in an economy. This is because contractual
savings institutions  have long-term and illiquid liabilities  on their balance sheets.
We argued that contractual savings development, in addition to its primary
purpose of providing  protection to the insured, produces the following  effects: a)
specialization  in the financial sector where the banking system adjusts towards its
comparative  advantage as contractual savings grow, thus reducing banks exposure to
term transformation  risks; b) improvement in the financial structure of firms by reducing
their leverage  and refinancing  risks; c) impact on the term structure of interest rates, the
stock market and growth; d) reduce the implicit debt from unfunded liabilities of defined-
benefit plans; and e) develop  the market for long-term government bonds and increase
possibilities of public debt management. We also argued  that these effects must be
stronger in developing countries  than in developed ones, due to the instability of banks in
developing countries. Therefore, contractual savings mitigate social and financial risks,
thus improving the resilience of the economy  to shocks, reducing the country risk
premium, the level of interest rates, and the cost of capital, thereby promoting growth.
In addition, the growth of contractual savings or either mutual funds or non-life
insurance should produce different effects on capital markets. Contractual savings should
be more powerful in developing capital markets because of the additional effect on the
liquidity of households' and firms' assets.
In the empirical analysis we showed that those countries with more developed
contractual savings sectors are also the countries  with more developed stock markets,
both in terms of market capitalization  and value traded. In addition, those countries
where the contractual savings sector grew the most are also the countries  that experienced
the highest growth in market capitalization  and value traded.
In the analysis of causality  between contractual savings and both market
capitalization  and value traded, the evidence strongly favors causality from contractual
savings to market capitalization,  particularly, in countries where capital markets are
relatively small and have an enabling regulatory and policy environment. These results
are confirmed  by differentiating,  with contractual savings institutions,  between pension
funds and life insurance companies. Causality between other institutional investors, like
non-life insurance companies, and markets appear to be much weaker.
For OECD countries,  the direction of causality from contractual savings to stock
markets and liquidity predominates. The small sample of developing countries results are
mixed with Chile exhibiting  causality in both directions, while Malaysia and Singapore
exhibit little if any form of causality  between institutions and markets. In these two
countries, the fact that management  is public and the governments have severely
restricted investments in domestic capital markets is probably responsible for this result.-30 -
Countries  interested in developing contractual savings are usually confronted with
the issue of having underdeveloped capital markets. Hence, sequencing of reforms is
important. Our analysis suggests  that significant  benefits will be derived from
developing contractual savings even if capital markets have not reached their appropriate
level of development. Initially, contractual savings institutions could invest primarily in
government securities, corporate bonds and long-term loans, and to the extent possible, in
shares and foreign securities.3 This would be equivalent to a strategy combining Chile
and the Netherlands. The difference  is that Chile, at the beginning of its pension reform,
did not allow investmnents  in shares, loans or foreign securities while it allowed
investments in bank deposits. 34 Such a strategy could work in an environment  of fiscal
discipline  and sound banking supervision. This is why we believe that long-term loans to
the private sector  offer better prospects as evidenced  by the Netherlands.
Simultaneously,  the authorities  should start improving  the regulatory framework  for
capital markets development (bond and stock markets), including regulations on asset-
backed securities (e.g., mortgage bonds), futures and derivatives. As the market
develops,  investment  regulations covering contractual savings institutions could  become
more flexible  while moving from non-market based instruments (e.g., loans) to market
based securities and ultimately adopting the prudent person rule.
Thus, the strategy advocates a comprehensive  approach  to contractual savings and
capital market development. We believe that it will provide greater benefits than first
pursuing capital market development  and only then promoting contractual savings. Both
should be pursued simultaneously.
Obviously, a successful reform requires an enabling macroeconomic  environment,
a sound banking system as well as reliable financial sector regulation and supervision,
and an appropriate  tax treatment.
33  hInvestment  in foreign  securities  provides  the potential  for  risk  diversification  to the insured  (if
investments  are  made  in  markets  which  have  low  or negative  correlation  with  the local  market)  and could
have  a direct  effect  of preventing  development  of domestic  capital  markets.  However,  it signals  that  the
govemment  is commnitted  to having  an open  capital  account  which  may  induce  higher  capital  inflows  and
an indirect  positive  effect  on  capital  markets.  Hence,  the net result  could  be positive.
34  At the beginning  of Chile's  pension  reform,  the investment  regulations  allowed  up  to 100  percent
in govemment  securities,  up to 60 percent  in  corporate  bonds,  and  up to 70 percent  in each  of the following
categories:  mortgage-backed  securities,  letters  of credit  or fixed  term  deposits.  As the market  developed,
regulations  were  relaxed  to allow  investments  in shares,  mutual  funds,  real  estate  funds,  venture  capital
funds,  securitised  credit  funds,  foreign  securities  and  hedging  instruments.-31 -
VII  Appendix 1: Granger  causality  tests
Table 8:  Contractual  savings  - Granger causality tests
Country  Obs  Granger  JB
Statl  pvall  Stat2  pv/2  Stat  pval
United  States  17  CS  ->  MC  F(1,14)  0.035  0.854  Chi2(1)  0.043  0.837  Chi2(2)  1.060  0.590
17  MC  -?  CS  F(1,14)  0.707  0.414  Chi2(1)  0.859  0.354  Chi2(2)  0.248  0.884
17  CS  -,  VT  F(1,14)  0.494  0.494  Chi2(1)  0.600  0.439  Chi2(2)  2.060  0.357
17  VT  -,  CS  F(1,14)  0.294  0.596  Chi2(1)  0.357  0.550  Chi2(2)  0.301  0.860
United  Kingdom  17  CS  ->  MC  F(1,14)  4.120  0.062  Chi2(1)  5.000  0.025  Chi2(2)  0.753  0.686
17  MC  -,  CS  F(1,14)  0.108  0.747  Chi2(1)  0.131  0.717  Chi2(2)  0.349  0.840
17  CS  - VT  F(1,14)  4.000  0.065  Chi2(1)  4.850  0.028  Chi2(2)  5.630  0.060
17  VT  ->  CS  F(1,14)  0.127  0.727  Chi2(1)  0.154  0.694  Chi2(2)  0.599  0.741
Belgium  16  CS  ->  MC  F(1,12)  2.870  0.116  Chi2(1)  3.59  0.058  Chi2(2)  0.286  0.867
15  MC  - CS  F(1,12)  0.010  0.922  Chi2(1)  0.013  0.911  Chi2(2)  1.540  0.463
16  CS  -,  VT  F(1,12)  1.750  0.211  Chi2(1)  2.180  0.140  Chi2(2)  2.560  0.278
15  VT  -,  CS  F(1,12)  0.039  0.847  Chi2(1)  0.048  0.826  Chi2(2)  1.510  0.469
Australia  9  CS  >  MC  F(1,6)  0.904  0.378  Chi2(1)  1.360  0.244  Chi2(2)  0.203  0.904
9  MC  ->  CS  F(1,6)  0.117  0.744  Chi2(1)  0.176  0.675  Chi2(2)  1.370  0.503
9  CS  -,  VT  F(1,6)  1.440  0.275  Chi2(1)  2.160  0.141  Chi2-(2)  1.270  0.531
9  VT  _,  CS  F(1,6)  0.984  0.359  Chi2(1)  1.480  0  .224  Chi2(2)  0.558  0.756
Korea  17  CS  -,  MC  F(1,14)  0.007  0.935  Chi2(1)  0.008  0.927  Chi2(2)  4.300  0.117
17  MC  ->  CS  F(1,14)  0.284  0.603  Chi2(1)  0.345  0.557  Chi2(2)  5.820  0.055
17  CS  -,  VT  F(1,14)  3.550  0.081  Chi2(1)  4.310  0.038  Chi2(2)  1.350  0.509
17  VT  _,  CS  F(1,14)  0.356  0.560  Chi2(1)  0.432  0.511  Chi2(2)  2.820  0.245
Spain  13  CS  ->  MC  F(1,10)  4.230  0.067  Chi2(1)  5.510  0.019  Chi2(2)  1.590  0.451
13  MC  ->  CS  F(1,10)  0.042  0.841  Chi2(1)  0.055  0.814  Chi2(2)  0.546  0.761
13  CS  ->  VT  F(1,10)  0.644  0.441  Chi2(1)  0.837  0.360  Chi2(2)  1.430  0.489
13  VT  _,  CS  F(1,10)  0.501  0.495  Chi2(1)  0.651  0.420  Chi2(2)  0.196  0.907
Netherlands  17  CS  -,  MC  F(1,14)  7.090  0.019  Chi2(1)  8.610  0.003  Chi2(2)  1.400  0.496
17  MC  ->  CS  F(1,14)  0.270  0.612  Chi2(1)  0.327  0.567  Chi2(2)  0.697  0.706
17  CS  _>  VT  F(1,14)  4.280  0.058  Chi2(1)  5.200  0.023  Chi2(2)  0.426  0.808
17  VT  ->  CS  F(1,14)  5.260  0.038  Chi2(1)  6.380  0.012  Chi2(2)  1.790  0.408
Canada  17  CS  -,.  MC  F(1,14)  3.740  0.074  Chi2(1)  4.540  0.033  Chi2(2)  1.490  0.474
17  MC  ->  CS  F(1,14)  0.001  0.972  Chi2(1)  0.002  0.969  Chi2(2)  0.162  0.922
17  CS  -,  VT  F(1,14)  2.030  0.171  Chi2(1)  2.530  0.112  Chi2(2)  0.437  0.804
17  VT  ->  CS  F(1,14)  0.592  0.454  Chi2(1)  0.719  0.396  Chi2(2)  0.242  0.886
Norway  15  CS  ->  MC  F(1,12)  3.830  0.072  Chi2(1)  4.850  0.028  Chi2(2)  0.264  0.B77
15  MC  - CS  F(1,12)  2.330  0.153  Chi2(1)  2.910  0.088  Chi2(2)  0.528  0.768
16  CS  -,  VT  F(1,13)  4.120  0.063  Chi2(1)  5.070  0.024  Chi2(2)  0.497  0.780
16  VT  -,  CS  F(1,13)  0.000  0.996  Chi2(1)  0.000  0.995  Chi2(2)  0.680  0.712
Sweden  12  CS  -,  MC  F(1,9)  1.280  0.291  Chi2(1)  1.680  0.195  Chi2(2)  0.921  0.631
12  MC  - CS  F(1,9)  0.012  0.914  Chi2(1)  0.017  0.898  Chi2(2)  0.102  0.950
12  CS  ->  VT  9(1,9)  4.910  0.054  Chi2(1)  6.540  0.011  Chi2(2)  0.273  0.873
12  VT  ->  CS  F(1,9)  0.130  0.727  Chi2(1)  0.173  0.678  Chi2(2)  0.255  0.880
Finland  7  CS  _>  MC  F(1,4)  7.600  0.051  Chi2(1)  13.300  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.732  0.832
7  MC  ->  CS  F(1,4)  0.033  0.865  Chi2(1)  0.057  0.811  Chi2(2)  0.367  0.832- 32  -
Country0 77^0000000  ;00000  Obs0  G  g7;gr  JB
:  Statii p  St  a  t20  pval  Stat  PO
7  CS  ->  VT  F(1,4)  17.200  0.014  Chi2(1)  30.100  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.302  0.860
7  VT  ->  CS  F(1,4)  0.059  0.820  Chi2(1)  0.103  0.748  Chi2(2)  0.213  0.899
Germany  17  CS  - M  MC  F(1,14)  5.680  0.032  Chi2(1)  6.900  0.009  Chi2(2)  1.790  0.408
17  MC  ->  CS  F  1,14)  0.035  0.854  Chi2(1)  0.043  0.836  Chi2(2)  6.040  0.049
17  CS  ->  VT  F(1,14)  8.330  0.012  Chi2(1)  1o.100  0.001  Chi2(2)  7.300  0.026
17  VT  ->  CS  F(1,14)  5.240  0.038  Chi2(1)  6.360  0.012  Chi2(2)  10.900  0.004
Austria  6  CS  -,  MC  F(1,3)  0.297  0.624  Chi2(1)  0.593  0.441  Chi2(2)  0.365  0.833
6  MC  ->  CS  F(1,3)  0.044  0.847  Chi2(1)  0.088  0.766  Chi2(2)  0.439  0.803
6  CS  ->  VT  F(1,3)  7.190  0.075  Chi2(1)  14.400  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.483  0.785
6  VT  -,  CS  F(1,3)  0.192  0.691  Chi2(1)  0.383  0.536  Chi2(2)  0.560  0.756
Portugal  8  CS  ->  MC  F(1,5)  8.320  0.034  Chi2(1)  13.300  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.094  0.954
8  MC  -,  CS  F(1,5)  3.420  0.124  Chi2(1)  5.470  0.019  Chi2(2)  0.635  0.728
8  CS  -,  VT  F(1,5)  1.480  0.278  Chi2(1)  2.370  0  124  Chi2(2)  0.235  0.889
8  VT  -,  CS  F(1,5)  0.077  0.793  Chi2(1)  0.122  0.726  Chi2(2)  4.870  0.087
Chile  9  CS  MC  F  (1,6)  1.990  0.208  Chi2(1)  2.980  0.084  Chi2(2)  0.392  0.822
9  MC  ->  CS  F(1,6)  5.640  0.055  Chi2(1)  8.460  0.004  Chi2(2)  0.707  0.702
9  CS  ->  VT  F(1,6)  5.120  0.064  Chi2(1)  7.690  0.006  Chi2(2)  1.710  0.426
9  VT  >  CS  F(1,6)  0.905  0.378  Chi2(1)  1.360  0.244  Chi2(2)  1.120  0.572
Singapore  15  CS  ->  MC  F(1,12)  1.590  0.231  Chi2(1)  1.990  0.158  Chi2(2)  4.560  0.102
15  MC  -,  CS  F(1,12)  0.183  0.677  Chi2(1)  0.228  0.633  Chi2(2)  1.190  0.552
15  CS  ->  VT  F(1,12)  0.001  0.944  Chi2(1)  0.001  0.936  Chi2(2)  22.000  0.000
15  VT  ->  CS  F(1,12)  4.640  0.052  Chi2(1)  5.800  0.016  Chi2(2)  0.728  0.695
Malaysia  15  CS  ->  MC  F(1,12)  0.897  0.362  Chi2(1)  1.120  0.290  Chi2(2)  1.140  0.564
15  MC  ->  CS  F(1,12)  0.316  0.585  Chi2(1)  0.395  0.530  Chi2(2)  7.910  0.019
17  CS  ->  VT  F  1,14)  0.381  0.547  Chi2(1)  0.463  0.496  Chi2(2)  1.650  0.438
17  VT  -,  CS  F(1,14)  0.003  0.960  Chi2(1)  0.003  0.955  Chi2(2)  7.960  0.019
Thailand  11  CS  ->  MC  F(1,8)  3.680  0.091  Chi2(1)  5.060  0.024  Chi2(2)  7.200  0.027
11  MC  ->  CS  F(1,8)  1.450  0.263  Chi2(1)  1.990  0.158  Chi2(2)  3.060  0.216
11  CS  ->  VT  F(1,8)  3.300  0.107  Chi2(1)  4.530  0.033  Chi2(2)  5.380  0.068
11  VT  -,  CS  F(1,8)  0.125  0.733  Chi2(1)  0.172  0.679  Chi2(2)  0.023  0.989
South  Africa  19  CS  ->  MC  F(1,16)  6.980  0.018  Chi2(1)  8.280  0.004  Chi2(2)  22.600  0.000
19  MC  ->  CS  F(1,16)  2.700  0.120  Chi2(1)  3.200  0.073  Chi2(2)  1.830  0.400
19  CS  ->  VT  F(1,16)  1.300  0.271  Chi2(1)  1.550  0.214  Chi2(2)  0.609  0.737
19  VT  ->  CS  F(1,16)  2.460  0.136  Chi2(1)  2.920  0.087  Chi2(2)  1.520  0.468
Source:  WB  institutional  investors  dataset  and  WDI.- 33 -
Table 9: Pension funds - Granger causality tests
Country  Obs  Granger  JB
Stat1 pvall  Stat2  pval2  SWat  pva
United  States  17  PF  ->  MC  F(1,14)  0.023  0.883  Chi2(1)  0.027  0.868  Chi2(2)  0.983  0.612
17  MC  ->  PF  F(1,14)  1.170  0.298  Chi2(1)  1.420  0.234  Chi2(2)  0.432  0.806
17  PF  -,  VT  F(1,14)  0.664  0.429  Chi2(1)  0.807  0.369  Chi2(2)  2.100  0.351
17  VT  ->  PF  F  (1,14)  0.397  0.539  Chi2(1)  0.483  0.487  Chi2(2)  0.386  0.824
United  Kingdom  17  PF  ->  MC  F(1,14)  1.070  0.319  Chi2(1)  1.300  0.255  Chi2(2)  0.067  0.967
17  MC  ->  PF  F(1,14)  0.098  0.759  Chi2(1)  0.119  0.730  Chi2(2)  0.324  0.851
17  PF  ->  VT  F(1,14)  4.010  0.065  Chi2(1)  4.870  0.027  Chi2(2)  3.500  0.174
17  VT  ->  PF  F(1,14)  0.618  0.445  Chi2(1)  0.751  0.386  Chi2(2)  0.456  0.796
Belgium  15  PF  ->  MC  F(1,12)  0.053  0.823  Chi2(1)  0.066  0.798  Chi2(2)  0.464  0.793
15  MC  ->  PF  F(1,12)  2.250  0.160  Chi2(1)  2.810  0.094  Chi2(2)  1.060  0.589
15  PF  ->  VT  F(1,12)  12.200  0.006  Chi2(1)  14.000  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.491  0.782
15  VT  - PF  F8(1,12)  1.970  0.186  Chi2(1)  2.470  0.116  Chi2(2)  1.200  0.549
Australia  9  PF  -,  MC  F(1,6)  0.960  0.365  Chi2(1)  1.440  0.230  Chi2(2)  0.371  0.831
9  MC  ->  PF  F(1,6)  0.756  0.418  Chi2(1)  1.130  0.287  Chi2(2)  0.409  0.815
9  PF  ->  VT  F(1,6)  2.100  0.198  Chi2(1)  3.140  0.076  Chi2(2)  0.320  0.852
9  VT  ->  PF  F  (1,6)  2.560  0.161  Chi2(1)  3.840  0.050  Chi2(2)  0.181  0.913
Korea  17  PF  -,  MC  F(1,14)  2.370  0.146  Chi2(1)  2.870  0.090  Chi2(2)  2.370  0.306
17  MC  ->  PF  F(1,14)  0.553  0.469  Chi2(1)  0.671  0.413  Chi2(2)  1.560  0.459
17  PF  -,  VT  F(1,14)  3.150  0.097  Chi2(1)  3.830  0.050  Chi2(2)  0.328  0.849
17  VT  ->  PF  F(1,14)  0.494  0.494  Chi2(1)  0.600  0.439  Chi2(2)  1.490  0.474
Spain  17  PF  ->  MC  F(1,14)  4.980  0.043  Chi2(1)  6.040  0.014  Chi2(2)  3.510  0.173
17  MC  ->  PF  F(1,14)  1.440  0.251  Chi2(1)  1.740  0.187  Chi2(2)  3.470  0.176
17  PF  ->  VT  F(1,14)  0.283  0.603  Chi2(1)  0.343  0.558  Chi2(2)  2.510  0.285
17  VT  -'  PF  F(1,14)  0 153  0.702  Chi2(1)  0.185  0  .667  Chi2(2)  2  .680  0.261
Netherlands  17  PF  ->  MC  F(1,14)  4.370  0.055  Chi2(1)  5.300  0.021  Chi2(2)  3.180  0.204
17  MC  -'  PF  F(1,14)  1.  090  0.  313  Chi2(1)  1.330  0  .249  Chi2(2)  0.925  0.630
17  PF  ->  VT  F(1,14)  2.690  0.123  Chi2(1)  3.270  0.071  Chi2(2)  0.499  0.779
17  VT  ->  PF  F(1,14)  5.760  0.031  Chi2(1)  7.000  0.008  Chi2(2)  1.660  0.437
Canada  17  PF  -,  MC  F(1,14)  4.190  0.060  Chi2(1)  5.080  0.024  Chi2(2)  1.530  0.464
17  MC  ->  PF  F(1,14)  1.070  0.318  Chi2(1)  1.300  0.254  Chi2(2)  0.790  0.674
17  PF  ->  VT  F(1,14)  2.230  0.158  Chi2(1)  2.700  0.100  Chi2(2)  0.451  0.798
17  VT  ->  PF  F(1,14)  0.085  0.775  Chi2(1)  0.103  0.748  Chi2(2)  0.464  0.793
Norway  15  PF  ->  MC  8'(1,12)  7.  110  0.021  Chi2(1)  8.890  0.003  Chi2(2)  2.390  0.303
15  MC  ->  PF  F(1,12)  0.483  0.500  Chi2(1)  0.603  0.437  Chi2(2)  0.322  0.851
16  PF  ->  VT  F(1,13)  6.370  0.025  Chi2(1)  7.840  0.005  Chi2(2)  0.367  0.832
16  VT  ->  PF  F(1,13)  0.655  0.433  Chi2(1)  0.806  0.369  Chi2(2)  1.690  0.429
Sweden  12  PF  -,  MC  F(1,9)  2.500  0.148  Chi2(1)  3.340  0.068  Chi2(2)  1.250  0.563
12  MC  ->  PF  F(1,9)  0.147  0.710  Chi2(1)  0.196  0.658  Chi2(2)  0.064  0.969
12  PF  -,  VT  F(1,9)  2.500  0.148  Chi2(1)  3.340  0.068  Chi2(2)  0.450  0.799
12  VT  ->  PF  F(1,9)  0.655  0.439  Chi2(1)  0.873  0.350  Chi2(2)  0.406  0.816
Finland  13  PF  ->  MC  P(1,10)  3.870  0.077  Chi2(1)  5.030  0.025  Chi2(2)  0.308  0.857
13  MC  ->  PF  F(1,10)  0.162  0.696  Chi2(1)  0.210  0.647  Chi2(2)  0.397  0.820
16  PF  ->  VT  F(1,13)  7.760  0.015  Chi2(1)  9.560  0.002  Chi2(2)  0.459  0.795
16  VT  ->  PF F(1,13)  0.069  0.797  Chi2(1)  0.085  0.770  Chi2(2)  0.254  0.881
Germany  17  PF  ->  MC  F(1,14)  0.020  0.889  Chi2(1)  0.025  0.876  Chi2(2)  1.020  0.601- 34 -
Co:ntry  Obs  Granger  JB
;::tl  a  pval;  Stat2  pval2  Stat  pvai
17  MC  ->  PF  F(1,.14)  0.012  0.915  Chi2(1)  0.014  0.905  Chi2(2)  2.820  0.244
17  PF  -,  VT  F(1,  14)  1.210  0.289  Chi2(1)  1.470  0.225  Chi2(2)  1.280  0.527
17  VT  -,  PF F(1,14)  0.233  0.637  Chi2(1)  0.283  0.595  Chi2(2)  2.730  0.256
Austria  6  PF  -,  MC  F(1,3)  0.796  0.438  Chi2(1)  1.590  0.207  Chi2(2)  0.401  0.818
6  MC  ->  PF  F  (1,3)  0.000  0.986  Chi2(1)  0.001  0.979  Chi2(2)  0.599  0.741
6  PF  -,  VT  F(1,3)  3.800  0.146  Chi2(1)  7.600  0.006  Chi2(2)  0.696  0.706
6  VT  ->  PF  PF(1,3)  10.300  0.049  Chi2(1)  20.500  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.644  0.725
Portugal  8  PF  -,  MC  F  (1,5)  8.600  0.033  Chi2(1)  13.800  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.255  0.880
8  MC  ->  PF  F(1,5)  2.110  0.206  Chi2(1)  3.380  0.066  Chi2(2)  0.715  0.699
8  PF  -,  VT  F  (1,5)  1.460  0.281  Chi2(1)  2.340  0.126  Chi2(2)  0.346  0.841
8  VT  ->  PF  F(1,5)  0.038  0.853  Chi2(1)  0.061  0.805  Chi2(2)  1.580  0.453
Chile  16  PF  ->  MC  F(1,13)  7.020  0.020  Chi2(1)  8.640  0.003  Chi2(2)  2.170  0.337
16  MC  ->  PF  F  (1,13)  5.450  0.036  Chi2(1)  6.700  0.010  Chi2(2)  0.593  0.743
16  PF  - VT  F(1,13)  12.000  0.004  Chi2(1)  14.800  0.000  Chi2 (2) 12.600  0.002
16  VT  -,  PF  F(1,13)  4.260  0.060  Chi2(1)  5.240  0.022  Chi2(2)  0.304  0.859
Singapore  16  PF  ->  MC  F(1,13)  1.070  0.321  Chi2(1)  1.310  0.252  Chi2(2)  5.670  0.059
16  MC  ->  PF  F(1,13)  0.019  0.893  Chi2(1)  0.023  0.879  Chi2(2)  0.850  0.654
22  PF  -,  VT  F(1,19)  0.127  0.725  Chi2(1)  0.148  0.701  Chi2 (2) 40.900  0.000
22  VT  - P  PF  F(1,19)  1.990  0.175  Chi2(1)  2.300  0.129  Chi2(2)  1.060  0.590
Malaysia  15  PF  -,  MC  F(1,12)  0.973  0.343  Chi2(1)  1.220  0.270  Chi2(2)  1.120  0.571
15  MC  ->  PF  F(1,12)  0.144  0.711  Chi2(1)  0.180  0.671  Chi2(2)  7.040  0.030
17  PF  ->  VT  F(1,14)  0.427  0.524  Chi2(1)  0.519  0.471  Chi2(2)  1.620  0.445
17  VT  -,  PF  F(1,14)  0.049  0.828  Chi2(1)  0.060  0.807  Chi2(2)  7.530  0.023
Thailand  13  PF  ->  MC  F(1,10)  4.460  0.061  Chi2(1)  5.800  0.016  Chi2 (2) 11.300  0.004
13  MC  ->  PF  F(1,10)  0.317  0.586  Chi2(1)  0.412  0.521  Chi2(2)  0.584  0.747
13  PF  -,  VT  F(1,10)  2.040  0.184  Chi2(1)  2.650  0.104  Chi2(2)  5.680  0.058
13  VT  ->  PF  F(1,10)  1.130  0.312  Chi2(1)  1.480  0.225  Chi2(2)  1.090  0.581
SouthAfrica  19  PF  ->  MC  F(1,16)  6.970  0.018  Chi2(1)  8.280  0.004  Chi2(2)  22.900  0.000
19  MC  ->  PF  F8(1,16)  0.118  0.735  Chi2(1)  0.141  0.708  Chi2(2)  0.110  0.946
19  PF  -,  VT  F  (1,16)  1.430  0.249  Chi2(1)  1.700  0.193  Chi2(2)  0.686  0.710
19  VT  ->  PF  F(1,16)  0.255  0.620  Chi2(1)  0.303  0.582  Chi2(2)  0.077  0.962
Source:  WB institutional  investors dataset  and WDI.- 35 -
Table 10:  Life insurance - Granger causality tests
Country  Obs  Granger  JS
Stat1 pvall  Stat2  pval2  Stat  pval
United  States  17  LI  ->  MC  F(1,14)  0.070  0.795  Chi2(1)  0.085  0.770  Chi2(2)  1.230  0.541
17  MC  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.050  0.826  Chi2(1)  0.061  0.805  Chi2(2)  0.834  0.659
17  LI  ->  VT  F(1,14)  0.163  0.692  Chi2(1)  0.198  0.656  Chi2(2)  2.120  0  .347
17  VT  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.228  0.640  Chi2(1)  0.277  0.599  Chi2(2)  0.673  0.714
United  Kingdom  17  LI  ->  MC  F(1,14)  5.470  0.035  Chi2(1)  6.640  0.Olo  Chi2(2)  0.045  0.978
17  MC  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.001  0.977  Chi2(1)  0.001  0.974  Chi2(2)  0.560  0.756
17  LI  ->  VT  F(1,14)  3.520  0.082  Chi2(1)  4.270  0.039  Chi2(2)  6.480  0.039
17  VT  -,  LI  F(1,14)  0.000  0.992  Chi2(1)  0.000  0.991  Chi2(2)  0.578  0.749
Belgium  16  LI  -,  MC  F(1,13)  4.670  0.050  Chi2(1)  5.750  0.017  Chi2(2)  0.229  0.892
16  MC  ->  LI  F(1,13)  0.128  0.726  Chi2(1)  0.157  0.692  Chi2(2)  3.900  0.142
16  LI  ->  VT  F(1,13)  0.715  0.413  Chi2(1)  0.157  0.692  Chi2(2)  4.910  0.086
16  VT  -,  LI  F(1,13)  0.311  0.586  Chi2(1)  0.383  0.536  Chi2(2)  4.200  0.123
Australia  17  LI  ->  MC  F(1,14)  0.098  0.758  Chi2(1)  0.120  0.730  Chi2(2)  0.419  0.811
17  MC  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.003  0.960  Chi2(1)  0.003  0.955  Chi2(2)  4.520  0.104
17  LI  ->  VT  F(1,14)  1.090  0.315  Chi2(1)  1.320  0.251  Chi2(2)  0.707  0.702
17  VT  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.298  0.594  Chi2(1)  0.361  0.548  Chi2(2)  2.110  0.348
Korea  17  LI  ->  MC  F(1,14)  0.064  0.804  Chi2(1)  0.077  0.781  Chi2(2)  4.480  0.106
17  MC  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.824  0.379  Chi2(1)  1.000  0.317  Chi2(2)  2.870  0.238
17  LI  ->  VT  F(1,14)  3.140  0.098  Chi2(1)  3.810  0.051  Chi2(2)  1.360  0.505
17  VT  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.029  0.868  Chi2(1)  0.035  0.852  Chi2(2)  1.490  0.474
Spain  13  LI  ->  MC  9(1,10)  0.386  0.549  Chi2(1)  0.501  0.479  Chi2(2)  2.230  0.328
13  MC  ->  LI  F(1,10)  0.185  0.676  Chi2(1)  0.240  0.624  Chi2(2)  0.424  0.809
13  LI  ->  VT  F(1,10)  0.110  0.747  Chi2(1)  0.143  0.706  Chi2(2)  6.810  0.033
13  VT  -,  LI  F(1,10)  1.560  0.239  Chi2(1)  2.030  0.154  Chi2(2)  0.634  0.728
Netherlands  17  LI  ->  MC  F(1,14)  7.380  0.017  Chi2(1)  8.970  0.003  Chi2(2)  0.276  0.871
17  MC  -,  LI  F(1,14)  0.020  0.891  Chi2(1)  0.024  0.878  Chi2(2)  1.940  0.379
17  LI  -'  VT  F(1,14)  6.190  0.026  Chi2(1)  7.510  0.006  Chi2(2)  0.190  0.909
17  VT  -,  LI  9(1,14)  4.150  0.061  Chi2(1)  5.040  0.025  Chi2(2)  0.051  0.975
Canada  17  LI  ->  MC  F(1,14)  2.880  0.112  Chi2(1)  3.490  0.062  Chi2(2)  1.310  0.520
17  MC  -s  LI  F(1,14)  1.860  0.195  Chi2(1)  2.250  0.133  Chi2(2)  0.063  0.969
17  LI  ->  VT  F(1,14)  1.750  0.207  Chi2(1)  2.130  0.145  Chi2(2)  0.411  0.814
17  VT  ->  LI  F(1,14)  3.590  0.079  Chi2(1)  4.360  0.037  Chi2(2)  0.006  0.997
Norway  115  LI  MC  F(1,12)  2.530  0.138  Chi2(1)  3.160  0.075  Chi2(2)  0.179  0.914
15  MC  -,  LI  F(1,12)  2.120  0.171  Chi2(1)  2.650  0.103  Chi2(2)  0.529  0.768
16  LI  ->  VT  F(1,13)  3.200  0.097  Chi2(1)  3.940  0.047  Chi2(2)  0.755  0.686
16  VT  -,  LI  F(1,13)  0.036  0.853  Chi2(1)  0.044  0.834  Chi2(2)  0.658  0.720
Sweden  12  LI  ->  MC  F(1,9)  1.150  0.312  Chi2(1)  1.530  0.216  Chi2(2)  0.900  0.637
12  MC  -'  LI  F(1,9)  0.036  0.853  Chi2(1)  0.048  0.826  Chi2(2)  0.108  0.947
12  LI  - VT  F(1,9)  5.020  0.052  Chi2(1)  6.690  0.010  Chi2(2)  0.293  0  .864
12  VT  ->  LI  F(1,9)  0.167  0.692  Chi2(1)  0.222  0.637  Chi2(2)  0.287  0.866
Finland  7  LI  ,  MC  F91,4)  9.050  0.040  Chi2(1)  15.800  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.418  0.811
7  MC  -,  LI  F(1,4)  0.006  0.940  Chi2(1)  0.011  0.916  Chi2(2)  0 274  0.872
7  LI  -,  VT  F(1,4)  6.300  0.066  Chi2(1) 11.000  0.001  Chi2(2)  0.768  0.681
7  VT  - LI  F(1,4)  0.066  0.810  Chi2(1)  0.116  0.734  Chi2(2)  0.321  0.852
Germany  17  LI  - MC  9(1,14)  6.310  0.025  Chi2(1)  7.660  0.006  Chi2(2)  1.910  0.384- 36 -
Country  Obs  ranger  bJB
Statl  pvall  Stat2  pval2  Stat  pval
17  MC  ->  LI  F(1, 14)  0.053  0.821  Chi2(1)  0.064  0.800  Chi2(2)  8.680  0.013
17  LI  ->  VT  F(1,14)  6  960  0.019  Chi2(1)  8.450  0.004  Chi2(2)  8.480  0.014
17  VT  -'  LI  F(1,14)  5.990  0.028  Chi2(1)  7.270  0.007  Chi2  (2)  12.800  0.002
Austria  10  LI  ->  MC  F(1,7)  2.730  0.142  Chi2(1)  3.900  0.048  Chi2(2)  0.986  0.611
10  MC  ->  LI  F(1,7)  0.055  0.821  Chi2(1)  0.079  0.778  Chi2(2)  0.223  0.894
10  LI  ->  VT  F(1,7)  0.642  0.449  Chi2(1)  0.917  0.338  Chi2(2)  0.449  0.799
10  VT  ->  LI  F(1,7)  0.222  0.652  Chi2(1)  0.317  0.574  Chi2(2)  0.097  0.953
Portugal  17  LI  ->  MC  F(1, 14)  4.470  0.053  Chi2(1)  5.430  0.020  Chi2(2)  0.515  0.773
17  MC  ->  LI  F(1,14)  0.279  0.605  Chi2(1)  0.339  0.560  Chi2(2)  4.000  0.135
17  LI  ->  VT  F(1,14)  5.070  0.041  Chi2(1)  6.160  0.013  Chi2(2)  1.500  0.472
17  VT  -,  LI  F(1,14)  0.885  0.363  Chi2(1)  1.080  0.300  Chi2(2)  2.140  0.343
Chile  9  LI  MC  F(1,6)  0.352  0.575  Chi2(1)  0.528  0.467  Chi2(2)  0.946  0.623
9  MC  -,  LI  F(1,6)  0.847  0.393  Chi2(1)  1.270  0.260  Chi2(2)  0.597  0.742
9  LI  -,  VT  F(1,6)  2.430  0.170  Chi2(1)  3.650  0.056  Chi2(2)  2.590  0.273
9  VT  -,  LI  F(1,6)  0.674  0.443  Chi2(1)  1.010  0.315  Chi2(2)  0.509  0.775
Singapore  15  LI  -,  MC  F(1,12)  1.770  0.208  Chi2(1)  2.210  0.137  Chi2  (2)  10.700  0.004
15  MC  -,  LI  F(1,12)  0.105  0.751  Chi2(1)  0.132  0.717  Chi2(2)  0.153  0.926
15  LI  ->  VT  F(1,12)  3.570  0.083  Chi2(1)  4.470  0.035  Chi2  (2)  10.400  0.006
15  VT  ->  LI  F(1,12)  0.468  0.507  Chi2(1)  0.585  0.444  Chi2(2)  0.170  0.918
Malaysia  19  LI  -,  MC  F(1,16)  1.180  0.293  Chi2((1)  1.400  0.236  Chi2(2)  4.020  0.134
19  MC  ->  LI  F(1,16)  0.603  0.449  Chi2(1)  0.716  0.397  Chi2(2)  3.480  0.175
21  LI  ->  VT  F(1,18)  4.510  0.048  Chi2(1)  5.260  0.022  Chi2  (2)  27.900  0.000
21  VT  >  LI  F(1,18)  0.008  0.929  Chi2(1)  0.010  0.922  Chi2(2)  3.360  0.186
Thailand  11  LI  MC  F(1,8)  2.060  0.189  Chi2(1)  2.830  0.092  Chi2(2)  4.780  0.091
11  MC  ->  LI  F(1,8)  0.049  0.830  Chi2(1)  0.067  0.795  Chi2(2)  8.810  0.012
11  LI  ->  VT  F(1,8)  3.980  0.081  Chi2(1)  5.470  0.019  Chi2(2)  8.550  0.014
11  VT  >  LI  F(1,8)  9.580  0.015  Chi2(1)  13.200  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.415  0.813
South  Africa  21  LI  ->  MC  5(1,18)  5.400  0.032  Chi2(1)  6.300  0.012  Chi2(2)  14.100  0.001
21  MC  _>  LI  F(1,18)  2.410  0.138  Chi2(1)  2.810  0.094  Chi2(2)  3.320  0.190
22  LI  ->  VT  F(1,19)  1.400  0.252  Chi2(1)  1.620  0.203  Chi2(2)  0.776  0.678
22  VT  _,  LI  F(1,19)  2.820  0.109  Chi2(1)  3.270  0.071  Chi2(2)  4.540  0.103
Source:  WB  institutional  investors  dataset  and  WDI.- 37 -
Table 11: Non-life  insurance  - Granger  causality tests
Country  Obs  Granger  JB
Satel pvail  Stat2  pv&l2  Stat  pval
United  States  17  NL  -,  MC  F(1,14)  0.058  0.814  Chi2(1)  0.070  0.791  Chi2(2)  0.449  0.799
17  MC  ->  NL  F(1,14)  0.017  0.900  Chi2(1)  0.020  0.887  Chi2(2)  0.115  0.944
17  NL  ->  VT  F(1,14)  0.344  0.567  Chi2(1)  0.418  0.518  Chi2(2)  2.840  0.241
17  VT  ->  NL  F(1,14)  0.340  0.569  Chi2(1)  0.413  0.521  Chi2(2)  0.101  0.951
United  Kingdom  17  NL  ->  MC  F(1,14)  2.160  0.164  Chi2(1)  2.620  0.106  Chi2(2)  1.530  0.464
17  MC  ->  NL  F(1,14)  0.793  0.388  Chi2(1)  0.963  0.326  Chi2(2)  1.740  0.418
17  NL  ->  VT  F(1,14)  4.800  0.046  Chi2(1)  5.830  0.016  Chi2(2)  5.410  0.067
17  VT  ->  NL  F(1,14)  0.673  0.426  Chi2(1)  0.817  0.366  Chi2(2)  2.090  0.352
Belgium  15  NL  -,  MC  F(1,12)  4.480  0.056  Chi2(1)  5.600  0.018  Chi2(2)  0.220  0.896
14  MC  - N  NL  F(1,11)  0.027  0.873  Chi2(1)  0.034  0.853  Chi2(2)  8.590  0.014
15  NL  ->  VT  F(1,12)  2.040  0.179  Chi2(1)  2.550  0.110  Chi2(2)  0.037  0.982
14  VT  - N  NL  F(1,11)  0.417  0.532  Chi2(1)  0.531  0.466  Chi2(2)  6.470  0.039
Australia  9  NL  -,  MC  F(1,6)  0.244  0.639  Chi2(1)  0.365  0.545  Chi2(2)  0.875  0.646
9  MC  - N  NL  F(1,6)  4.870  0.069  Chi2(1)  7.300  0.007  Chi2(2)  0.172  0.918
9  NL  ->  VT  F(1,6)  0.000  0.993  Chi2(1)  0.000  0.991  Chi2(2)  5.300  0.071
9  VT  - N  NL  F(1,6)  8.320  0.028  Chi2(1)  12.500  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.441  0.802
Korea  17  NL  ->  MC  F(1,14)  3.150  0.098  Chi2(1)  3.830  0.050  Chi2(2)  3.790  0.150
17  MC  - N  NL  F(1,14)  1.290  0.275  Chi2(1)  1.570  0.210  Chi2(2)  0.219  0.896
17  NL  -,  VT  F(1,14)  0.164  0.691  Chi2(1)  0.200  0.655  Chi2(2)  0.400  0.819
17  VT  -'  NL  F(1,14)  1.310  0.272  Chi2(1)  1.590  0.208  Chi2(2)  0.595  0.743
Spain  13  NL  ->  MC  F(1,10)  0.095  0.764  Chi2(1)  0.124  0.725  Chi22(2)  3.400  0.183
13  MC  N>  NL  F(1,10)  0.227  0.644  Chi2(1)  0.295  0.587  Chi2(2)  5.140  0.077
13  NL  ->  VT  F(1,10)  0.040  0.846  Chi2(1)  0.052  0.820  Chi2(2)  4.010  0.135
13  VT  ->  NL  F(1,10)  0.738  0.410  Chi2(1)  0.960  0.327  Chi2(2) 12.100  0.002
Netherands  16  NL  ->  MC  F(1,13)  13.6C0  0.003  Chi2(1) 27.000  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.065  0.968
16  MC  ->  NL  F(1,13)  0.129  0.725  Chi2(1)  0.159  0.690  Chi2(2)  1.030  0.598
16  NL  -,  VT  F(1,13)  6.930  0.021  Chi2(1)  8.520  0.004  Chi2(2)  1.980  0.371
16  VT  ->  NL  F(1,13)  0.310  0.587  Chi2(1)  0.381  0.537  Chi2(2)  5.360  0.068
Canada  17  NL  -,  MC  F(1,14)  2.040  0.175  Chi2(1)  2.480  0.116  Chi2(2)  0.283  0.868
17  MC  - N  ML  F(1,14)  0.937  0.350  Chi2(1)  1.140  0.286  Cbi2(2)  1.240  0.538
17  NL  -,  VT  F(1,14)  0.561  0.466  Chi2(1)  0.681  0.409  Chi2(2)  0.137  0.934
17  VT  - N  ML  F(1,14)  1.060  0.321  Chi2(1)  1.290  0.256  Cbi2(2)  0.578  0.749
Norway  15  NL  ->  MC  F(1,12)  8.390  0.013  Chi2(1)  10.500  0.001  Chi2(2)  0.273  0.872
15  MC  -,  NL  F(1,12)  3.2C0  0.099  Chi2(1)  4.000  0.045  Chi2(2)  0.615  0.735
16  NL  -,  VT  F(1,13)  4.180  0.062  Chi2(1)  5.150  0.023  Chi2(2)  0.579  0.749
16  VT  - N  NL  F(1,13)  0.004  0.953  Chi2(1)  0.004  0.947  Chi2(2)  0.970  0.616
Sweden  12  NL  ->  MC  F(1,9)  3.860  0.081  Chi2(1)  5.140  0.023  Chi2(2)  0.268  0.875
12  MC  - N  NL  F(1,9)  0.  573  0.468  Chi2(1)  0.764  0.382  Chi2(2)  1.030  0.599
12  NL  -,  VT  F(1,9)  12.100  0.007  Chi2(1) 16.100  0.000  Chi2(2)  1.250  0.534
12  VT  - N  NL  F(1,9)  12.1C0  0.007  Chi2(1)  16.100  0.000  Chi2(2)  6.100  0.047
Finland  8  NL  -,  MC  F(1,5)  1.440  0.284  Chi2(1)  2.310  0.129  Chi2(2)  0.760  0.684
8  MC  - N  NL  F(1,5)  0.005  0.947  Chi2(1)  0.008  0.930  Chi2(2)  4.880  0.087
8  NL  ->  VT  F(1,5)  2.450  0.178  Chi2(1)  3.920  0.048  Chi2(2)  0.650  0.722
8  VT  ->  NL  F(1,5)  0.090  0.776  Chi2(1)  0.145  0.704  Chi2(2)  3.840  0.147
Germany  17  NL  ->  MC  F(1,14)  17.7C0  0.001  Chi2(1) 21.500  0.000  Chi2(2)  2.570  0.276- 38 -
Country  Obs  Granger  JB
Stat1 pvall  Stat2  pva!2  Stat  pval
17  MC  ->  NL  F(1,14)  1.S90  0.228  Chi2(1)  1.930  0.165  Chi2(2)  4.870  0.088
17  NL  ->  VT  F(1,14)  9.860  0.007  Chi2(1) 12.000  0.001  Chi2(2)  14.500  0.001
17  VT  -,  NL  F(1,14)  7.  510  0.016  Chi2(1)  9.120  0.003  Chi2(2)  3.010  0.222
Austria  10  NL  ->  MC  F(1,7)  5.950  0.045  Chi2(1)  8.500  0.004  Chi2(2)  0.013  0.994
10  MC  ->  NL  F(1,7)  0.000  0.994  Chi2(1)  0.000  0  .992  Chi2(2)  0.222  0.  895
10  NL  -,  VT  F(1,7)  0.575  0.473  Chi2(1)  0.822  0.365  Chi2(2)  0.506  0.776
10  VT  -,  NL  F(1,7)  0.963  0.359  Chi2(1)  1.380  0 241  Chi2(2)  1 050  0.593
Portugal  9  NL  ->  MC  F)1,6)  6.180  0.047  Chi2(1)  9.260  0.002  Chi2(2)  0.490  0.783
9  MC  ->  NL  F(1,6)  2.210  0.187  Chi2(1)  3.320  0.068  Chi2(2)  2.670  0.263
9  NL  ->  VT  F(1,6)  7.180  0.037  Chi2(1)  10.800  0.001  Chi2(2)  0.047  0.977
9  VT  - N  NL  F(1,6)  2.270  0.183  Chi2(1)  3.400  0.065  Chi2(2)  0.322  0.851
Chile  9  NL  -,  MC  F(1,6)  0.  Oll  0.920  Chi2(1)  0.016  0.898  Chi2(2)  0.971  0.615
9  MC  ->  NL  F(1,6)  0.725  0.427  Chi2(1)  1.090  0.297  Chi2(2)  3.430  0.18D
9  NL  -,  VT  F21,6) 43  .100  0.001  Chi2(1) 64.700  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.667  0.716
9  VT  -,  NL  F(1,6)  0.000  0.998  Chi2(1)  0.000  0.997  Chi2(2)  3.100  0.212
Singapore  15  NL  -,  MC  F(1,12)  0.011  0.919  Chi2(1)  0.013  0.908  Chi2(2)  8.270  0.016
15  MC  - N  NL  F(1,  12)  4.290  0.061  Chi2(1)  5.360  0.021  Chi2(2)  0.477  0.788
15  NL  ->  VT  F(1,12)  0.457  0.512  Chi2(1)  0.572  0.450  Chi2 (2)  24.300  0.000
15  VT  ->  NL  F(1,12)  7.200  0.020  Chi2(1)  9.000  0.003  Chi2(2)  0.446  0.800
Malaysia  19  NL  -,  MC  F(1,16)  0.049  0.827  Chi2(1)  0.058  0.809  Chi2(2)  5.150  0.076
19  MC  - N  NL  F(1,16)  3.090  0.098  Chi2(1)  3.670  0.055  Chi2(2)  0.648  0.723
21  NL  -,  VT  F(1,18)  8.830  0.008  Chi2(1)  10.300  0.001  Chi2(2)  34.600  0.000
21  VT  ->  NL  F(1,18)  0.142  0.711  Chi2(1)  0.165  0.685  Chi2(2)  0.758  0.685
Thailand  5  NL  ->  MC  F(1,2)  12.400  0.072  Chi2(1) 31.100  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.628  0.731
5  MC  - NL  F(1,2)  3.520  0.201  Chi2(1)  8.810  0.003  Chi2(2)  0.948  0.622
5  NL  ->  VT  F(1,2)  15.200  0.060  Chi2(i)  38.000  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.399  0.819
5  VT  - N  NL  F 1,2)  9.960  0.087  Chi2(1)  24.900  0.000  Chi2(2)  0.232  0.890
South  Africa  21  NL  ->  MC  F(1,18)  2.190  0.156  Chi2(1)  2.560  0.110  Chi2(2)  3.560  0.169
21  MC  ->  NL  F(1,18)  0.924  0.349  Chi2(1)  1.080  0.299  Chi2(2)  0.183  0.912
21  NL  ->  VT  F(1,18)  6.520  0.020  Chi2(1)  7.610  0.006  Chi2(2)  0.127  0.938
21  VT  ->  NL  F(1,18)  0.556  0.465  Chi2(1)  0.649  0.421  Chi2(2)  0.141  0.932
Source: WB institutional  investors dataset  and WDI.-39 -
Vil  Appendix  2: Data
Data on financial assets of pension funds, life, and non-life  insurance companies  for
OECD countries come from OECD 1997  and 1998 Institutional  Investors Statistical
Yearbooks. For non-OECD  countries  the sources are the following:
a)  data for Chile, were specially  assembled  by Central Bank of Chile at our request.
b)  data for Thailand  was obtained from the Association  of Provident  Funds and the
Annual Report of the Department  of Insurance  in the Ministry of Commerce.
c)  data for South  Africa is published  in the Federal Reserve  Bank quarterly bulletin.
d)  data for Malaysia is published  in the insurance  annual report and the EPF annual
report  by Bank Negara.
e)  data for Singapore  is published in the yearbook  of statistics  by the Departrnent  of
Statistics.
All other variables come from the World Development  Indicators  database.
Stock Market Value Traded Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded
during the period. Data are in current local currency.
Stock Market Capitalization:  Market capitalization  (also known as market value) is the
share price times the number  of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies  refer to
the number of domestically  incorporated  companies  listed on the country's  stock
exchanges  at the end of the year. Data are in current  local currency.
Table 12: List of countries
AUS  Australia  ISL  Iceland
AUT  Austria  ITA  Italy
BEL  Belgium  JPN  Japan
CAN  Canada  KOR  Korea,  Rep.
CHE  Switzerland  NLD  Netherlands
CHL  Chile  NOR  Norway
DEU  Germany  NZL  New  Zealand
DNK  Denmark  PRT  Portugal
ESP  Spain  SGP  Singapore
FIN  Finland  SWE  Sweden
GBR  United Kingdom  THA  Thailand
GRC  Greece  USA  United  States
HUN  Hungary  ZAF  South Africa- 40 -
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